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Executive Summary 
 
Ensuring that public policies cater for sustainable, accessible and adequate retirement 
incomes now and in the future remains a priority for the EU. While Member States share 
similar fundamental challenges there are considerable differences in the timing of 
demographic ageing, the design of pension arrangements, the growth potential and in 
constraints on account of the fiscal situation and external competitiveness. The projected 
increase in public spending due to population ageing poses an important challenge to EU 
Member States. Policy action to improve the long term sustainability of public finances 
while ensuring adequacy of pensions is crucial.  
 
A - CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS  
(1) People today are healthier and live longer than ever in history. At the same time 
they have fewer children than they used to. 
Over the last decades, life expectancy has steadily been rising, with an increase of up to 
two and a half years per decade. If reduction of mortality continues at this pace, most 
people in the EU will live very long lives. This would mean life expectancy at birth for 
men would increase by 8.5 years and by 6.9 years for women over the next fifty years. 
Fertility rates have decreased in almost all Member States and in some they have 
remained very low. The combination of rising longevity and lower fertility will lead to a 
steep aggravation of the old age dependency ratio. The size of the working-age 
population is projected to shrink and this will reduce potential labour supply and 
economic growth. This will have far-reaching consequences for economic, budgetary and 
social developments.  
 
(2) Faced by a strong increase in the old age dependency ratio, most Member States 
have over the last decade reformed their pension systems to retain sustainability as well 
as adequacy and to ensure fairness between and within generations and between men 
and women. Reforms have brought important progress, notably in sustainability for 
public pension schemes, and to varying degrees also in some aspects of adequacy and 
minimum income provisions for older people in particular.  
The adopted reforms considerably limit the growth in projected public pension 
expenditure over the long-term, as appears from the 2009 Ageing Report. Thereby 
reforms may greatly improve the ability of public schemes to continue to provide 
adequate pension benefits in a sustainable manner. Nonetheless, public pension 
expenditure in the EU as a whole is projected to rise by 2 ½ p.p. of GDP by 2060, which 
equals an increase of 23% on average of public pension expenditure, and in some 
Member States substantially more.  
Improvements in sustainability largely result from closer links between contributions and 
benefit accruals, actuarial adjustment mechanisms and changes to valorisation and 
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indexation rules, which as shown by the December 2009 ISG-SPC report1 tend to reduce 
the earnings-related replacement rates for people retiring at the same age as today. 
With many reforms the challenge in public pension delivery increasingly turns to 
achieving adequate replacement levels while ensuring sustainability. Reforms of public 
schemes usually contain measures to raise replacement rates through extension of 
working life and in several Member States new or expanded supplementary pension 
schemes have opened additional possibilities for many people to compensate for 
limitations in public provision through greater savings and the build-up of additional 
entitlements. 
Many reforms have resulted in wider coverage (e.g. inclusion of farmers, self employed, 
women with low entitlements etc.) and better fit with gender roles (e.g. crediting of 
caring years) and changing labour markets, though some problems still needs to be 
addressed (e.g. atypical careers and short term contracts). The shift from best years 
towards career average as calculation base for earnings-related pension schemes in many 
Member States has enhanced their intra-generational fairness and sustainability.  
Changes adopted have also pertained to pensions currently in payment. Several reforms 
have led to increases in minimum pensions and supplementary allowances.  
Underpinned by restrictions on early retirement and stronger work incentives, periods of 
high labour demand and changes in the characteristics of the 55-59 year olds have 
resulted in higher employment rates of older workers thus reversing long standing trends 
towards earlier retirement.  
(3) Recognizing the progress, the challenge of adapting the pension systems in some of 
the EU Member States to expected demographic changes is still very real. Additional 
reforms of pension policy will be needed in several countries. Furthermore, there are 
signs that ongoing reforms might bear considerable risks in terms of both adequacy 
and sustainability. As changes in pension systems will tend to make benefits more 
contingent on developments in labour and financial markets, important risks relate to 
employment rates not increasing enough or capital markets not delivering as expected. 
Budgetary consolidation, which is more urgent after the economic crisis, is essential in 
order to reduce public debt and to contribute to financing the future increase in public 
pension expenditure.  
In many Member States reforms are changing pension systems from largely single tier to 
truly multi-tier systems. In most Member States, the bulk of pension income will 
continue to be provided by public pay-as-you-go schemes. As the role of funded and 
defined-contribution pensions grows and public pensions increasingly become based on 
life-time earnings-related contributions, future pension adequacy will increasingly rest on 
good economic performance, the ability of labour markets to provide opportunities for 
longer and less interrupted contributory careers, a strengthened relationship between 
contributions and benefits in pension systems, and a combination of safe and appropriate 
returns from financial markets. 
                                                 
1 For more detailed information see the report "Updates of current and prospective theoretical pension 
replacement rates 2006-2046",  
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=752&newsId=551&furtherNews=yes 
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Moreover, there are considerable risks remaining. In some Member States additional 
reforms of pension policy will be needed in view of the scale of demographic changes 
ahead. For several countries where the pension reform process has not been set 
sufficiently in motion, there is an urgent need to review the 'pension promise' in view of 
what the rest of the economy can be expected to support. For some other countries, 
additional measures might be needed to ensure the lasting success of reforms already 
implemented. 
B - REMAINING RISKS AGGRAVATED BY THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
(4) Sustainability and adequacy concerns for all types of pension schemes have been 
aggravated by the crisis. Lower growth prospects and increasing deficit and debt affect 
sustainability. Regarding adequacy, today’s pensioners have generally been well-
protected against the crisis, but pensions may be affected by unemployment periods and 
lower contributions and poorer returns in financial markets. The crisis has an impact 
on the currently active population, and thus on the accumulation of pension rights, 
notably for younger generations.  
With secure incomes from public pensions, which have been allowed to perform their 
role as automatic stabilisers, current pensioners have so far been among the population 
groups least affected by the crisis. Exceptions apart, benefits from funded schemes still 
play only a marginal role in the pensions of retired Europeans and just a few Member 
States with very acute public budget problems have had to adjust public pensions in 
payment. In several Member States, funded schemes will be much more important for 
benefit delivery in the future.   
The crisis has strongly reduced the market value of pension fund assets and it has led to a 
sharp deterioration in public finances, which to varying degrees is putting stress on public 
spending for pension provision. After the steep tumble in financial markets prices in 
2008, many pension funds have been able to recoup some of their losses in 20092 and 
early 2010. This should be seen against the background of the scale of fiscal deterioration 
as a result of the crisis which, expressed in terms of debt, represents nearly 20% of GDP, 
which will severely constrain public pension provision. This, in combination with pre-
existing weaknesses and imbalances implies that there will be an unprecedented need for 
coordinated fiscal consolidation.   
(5) The crisis has highlighted the need to review the degree of financial market 
exposure and the design of risk sharing in funded pensions. 
The trend observed in some Member States towards more private sector funded pension 
provision can help reduce explicit public finance liabilities, but it also creates new 
challenges and forms of risks. Variations in the ability of funded schemes to weather the 
present crisis show that differences in design, regulation and investment strategy matter. 
Achieving a better balance for pension savers and pension providers between risks, 
security and returns will be key to enhance public confidence in funded pensions and 
ensure their contribution to adequacy of retirement incomes.  
 
                                                 
2  See OECD "Pension Markets in Focus".  October 2009, Issue 6. 
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C - AGGRAVATED CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 
(6) Adequacy and sustainability are two faces of the same coin. In general, people need 
to work more and longer to ensure both.3 There is no one-size-fits-all solution to 
pension delivery: all systems have pros and cons and all need to adapt to long-term 
demographic and economic trends. The challenge for policy makers is to aim for a 
good balance between sustainability and adequacy. The crisis and possible lower 
economic growth will make this harder and more urgent. It is therefore vital to 
strengthen awareness of available routes to adequate income in retirement. 
Transparency and information are essential to gain public trust and guide behaviour. 
To fully ascertain the balance between adequacy and sustainability in pension systems, 
better coordinated work at EU level on measurements and data will be needed.  
The overall framework agreed by the Stockholm European Council – the tree-pronged 
strategy of: (i) reducing debt at a fast pace; (ii) raising employment rates and 
productivity; and, (iii) reforming pension, health care and long-term care systems – for 
coping with the challenge posed by ageing populations remains valid and progress on 
each of the three pillars will be indispensible. Nevertheless, in some countries the crisis 
has increased the urgency to modernise pension policies using a holistic approach. 
Budgetary consolidation and attaining the medium-term budgetary objectives is essential 
in order to reduce public debt and to contribute to financing the future increase in public 
pension expenditure.  
The crisis will affect all pension designs. It has revealed some weaknesses in certain 
aspects of reformed systems that will need to be addressed, in particular, the role of 
funded schemes and the interaction between public and private pillars.  
The crisis has also highlighted that economic growth, employment, good regulation of 
financial markets solidarity and fairness between and within generations are interlinked 
key components of pension policy. Macroeconomic stability and well-functioning labour 
and financial markets are needed for pension systems to work well. Reducing structural 
unemployment would bring major benefits.  
Without working longer, the adequacy-sustainability balance will be difficult to reach. 
Many pension reforms on their own would reduce annual replacement rates unless people 
work more and longer. People need to be made aware of possibilities for raising their 
level of retirement income through the build up of supplementary pensions and extra 
entitlements, while having access to appropriate information on the various related risks. 
The crisis adds to the need for policy-makers to provide stability by being transparent on 
pension policy, on the routes that are and will be available to retirement incomes in the 
future and to provide guidance, so as to enable people to change their behaviour. 
(7) Employment rate improvements over the last decade may come under threat and 
there is still considerable need for progress. Growth prospects, appropriate work 
incentives, open labour markets and increasing effective retirement ages are needed to 
enable more people working more and longer.  
Only around 40% of people are still in employment at the age of 60 and female 
employment rates are still substantially below those of men. This represents a huge 
                                                 
3 People in bad health may require special consideration. 
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untapped potential and raising the overall employment rates for all, in particular of older 
workers and women, and thereby increasing effective retirement ages will be a key policy 
objective for EU Member States. The positive aspects of migration should be fully 
exploited.  
Achieving the necessary extension in working lives in view of continuous gains in life 
expectancy will prove challenging as adjustments will also be needed in age management 
in work places and labour markets and in the expectations and behaviour of workers.  
Tax/benefit and wage systems could provide financial incentives for people to remain 
economically active and building their own human capital. Policies to tackle age-
discrimination and to promote life-long learning, flexible retirement pathways and 
healthy job opportunities for older workers would also be needed.  
Besides measures concerning the pension systems, governments need to promote 
opportunities for people to work more and longer and for further developing additional 
sources of income. Having access to pension schemes which are simple to understand, of 
low cost and suited to the modern workplace is essential to address the ageing transition. 
Involving all stakeholders (e.g. the social partners) to achieve this will be important.  
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1 An introduction to pension reforms  
1.1 Pension reforms in the European Union 
Over the last 15 years consecutive waves of Member State reforms in response to the 
challenge of ageing have markedly altered pension systems and pension scheme designs 
across the Union.  
During this period, the EU has sought to underpin this process by providing a framework 
for policy learning with common objectives conducive to the planning, implementation 
and assessment of such reforms through the Growth and Jobs strategy (Lisbon process) 
and the Social Open Method of Coordination. Moreover, the fiscal framework in the EU 
– the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) – has been strengthened, including the need for 
pursuing structural reforms in the field of pensions that contribute to long-term fiscal 
sustainability.  
As the Lisbon process is being replaced by the Europe 2020 strategy, it is time to take 
stock of the progress made. With the financial crisis and the economic downturn, 
Member States have to revisit achievements and re-assess core responses in the light of 
the short- and longer-term impacts on the various elements in their pension systems.  
 
Main reasons for pension reforms   
 
The looming challenge of ageing populations and its implications for the ensuring long-
term sustainability of public finances alongside with social protection deficiencies have 
been very effective catalysts for reforms.  
In the coming decades, Europe's population will undergo dramatic demographic changes 
due to low fertility rates, continuous increases in life expectancy and the retirement of the 
baby-boom generation (see Figure 1 and Figure 2).  
Figure 1 - Demographic structure of population in 2008 and 2060 
         2008             2060 
 
Source: Commission services 
Note: the red (dark) bar indicates the most numerous cohort. 
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Though the exact impact will be determined by several factors, ageing populations will 
pose major economic, budgetary and societal challenges. It is expected to have a 
significant impact on economic growth and lead to strong pressures to increase public 
spending. This will make it difficult for Member States to maintain sound and sustainable 
public finances in the long-term. Ensuring fiscal sustainability requires keeping the EU’s 
fiscal house in order, which involves addressing budgetary imbalances before the 
budgetary impact of ageing starts to be felt in earnest.  
 
Figure 2 - Evolution of demographic dependency ratios between 2010 and 2060 
 
Source: Commission services 
Pension reforms are challenging because they involve long-term decisions in the face of 
short-term political pressures. As the need for changes may not be easily understood or 
fully accepted by citizens, pension reform also tends to be controversial and face 
considerable political resistance. This may lead to a tendency to postpone reforms, delay 
when changes take effect and leave problems for the next government(s) and generations 
to tackle.  
In some cases, reforms have altered the fundamental structure of pension provision in one 
go. In others, reform has been evolutionary, involving a series of small changes over 
time, but often adding up to substantial changes in the characteristics and workings of 
schemes. 
Pension planners must now expect the vast bulk of people to reach pensionable age and 
that most of them upon arrival will enjoy ever more years in retirement. They must also 
calculate with the fact that the number people of working age to people of retirement age 
will be halved as the baby-boomers over the next decades enter retirement. On 
demographic trends the share of resources that have to be moved from workers to retirees 
is therefore set to continue to increase and the task of ensuring sustainability to become 
steadily tougher.  
With an increase in average duration within any pension scheme, pension provision has 
become far more costly and challenging. This fact will put public finances under severe 
stress. In order to cater for long term sustainability of public finances reforms of pension 
systems have been, and in many countries still are, necessary.  
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The structural growth in female labour force participation and employment rates at all 
ages have fundamentally altered how pension systems relate to households and 
individuals.  
In labour markets substantial increases in working career mobility, changes in the length 
and character of contracts, greater flexibility requirements and the enlarged role of 
earnings as base for social protection contributions and future entitlements have 
transformed the way pension systems interact with and need to underpin employment 
objectives. 
Key longer term questions that have emerged and to which pension reforms have sought 
answers are: How should the increases in longevity be divided into work and leisure and 
how should the costs of longer lives be shared between and within generations given the 
overall demographic outlook? How can a fairer and more sustainable balance between the 
number of years people spend in work and in retirement be achieved?  
Important reforming efforts have been directed at improving the financing and social 
protection effectiveness of pensions in payment, i.e. conditions for current pensioners. 
Member States have used reforms to widen and consolidate the revenue base for present 
pension expenditure and they have widened coverage to enhance social protection for 
groups with poor access to pensions. Several have sought to improve intra-generational 
fairness in benefit calculation while also improving the sustainability of earnings-related 
pensions.  
Many countries have launched measures to improve benefit levels in basic or minimum 
pensions and other forms of minimum income provision for older people. In some 
countries better indexing and ad hoc rises have been used to maintain the value of 
benefits and align them better with the growth in societal wealth. Beyond pensions 
payments Member States have also raised the reach, quality and availability of benefits in 
cash or in kind such as housing, heating and personal need allowances or access to social 
and health services for older people. 
Several reforms have aimed at integrating schemes for different sectors and/or at 
harmonising conditions for various categories of workers as well as for men and women. 
Simplification and consolidation delivering economies of scale have also been means to 
achieve common incentive structures, equal treatment and greater equity. 
Present pensioners often receive pensions according to several historic sets of partly 
overlapping rules and pension reforms may only apply fully to the entitlements of the 
youngest cohorts of present workers. Even when they introduce wholly new structures 
and rules, pension reforms must make bridges between existing and new provisions. 
Devising transition rules that allow for the new regime to take effect sufficiently quickly 
while also respecting existing rights is a difficult balance to achieve. Moreover, reforms 
securing higher effectiveness and better sustainability in the future do not free policy 
makers from having to find the means to meet the entitlements and needs of current 
pensioners. 
There are many similarities in the long term challenges and the shorter term problems 
which Member States have sought to address through reforms. But countries come from 
different legacies and there is no one-size-fits-all solution or single best pension design 
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which can be applied. The type of design needs to fit the specific economic, social and 
demographic characteristics of the population it is meant to serve and the quality of 
implementation also exerts considerable influence on eventual outcomes. Indeed the 
country specific needs, means and preferences that determined reforms have produced a 
rich variation of scheme and system designs.  
In the course of events reformers have realised that adequacy and sustainability are two 
sides of the same coin. One cannot meaningfully have one without the other. What 
reforms ultimately must strive to achieve is an appropriate balance between the dual 
goals. Member States have reflected this insight in the common pension objectives they 
adopted in 2001 and confirmed them in an updated form in 2006 (see the Box: Common 
objectives for pensions).  
Encouraging later retirement would, if entitlements are linked to the length of 
contributory records, improve both the adequacy of benefits earned and financial 
sustainability of schemes. Similarly, extending coverage of pensions would broaden the 
contribution base and raise schemes revenues while also improving the social protection 
and future retirement benefits of formerly excluded workers.  
1.2 The European framework in support of pension reform 
1.2.1 The Open Method of Coordination (SPSI) and the Laeken 
objectives 
In 2001 Member States agreed a set of objectives for their pension systems which since 
have guided reform efforts and their assessment at EU level. Member States and the 
Commission assess progress towards the common objectives within the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) on social protection and social inclusion which has the Social 
Protection Committee as its pivot. The Social OMC works through common setting of 
objectives by the Commission and the Council, developing common indicators that 
measure progress towards objectives, reporting by the Member States on the basis of 
those objectives, and summarising of the findings by the Commission in an annual report 
subsequently endorsed by the Council (Joint Report). 
The common objectives for pensions are listed in the Box: Common objectives for 
pensions, using the form in which they were confirmed in 2006. 
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Box: Common objectives for pensions 
Member States are committed to providing adequate and sustainable pensions by 
ensuring: 
(1) adequate retirement incomes for all and access to pensions which allow people to 
maintain, to a reasonable degree, their living standard after retirement, in the spirit of 
solidarity and fairness between and within generations; 
(2) the financial sustainability of public and private pension schemes, bearing in mind 
pressures on public finances and the ageing of populations, and in the context of the 
three-pronged strategy for tackling the budgetary implications of ageing, notably by: 
supporting longer working lives and active ageing; by balancing contributions and 
benefits in an appropriate and socially fair manner; and by promoting the affordability
and the security of funded and private schemes; 
(3) that pension systems are transparent, well adapted to the needs and aspirations of 
women and men and the requirements of modern societies, demographic ageing and 
structural change; that people receive the information they need to plan their retirement 
and that reforms are conducted on the basis of the broadest possible consensus. 
1.2.2 The three-pronged Stockholm strategy for coping with ageing  
Coping with an ageing population is a key policy challenge in the EU.  The Stockholm 
European Council decided in March 2001 that ‘The Council should regularly review the 
long-term sustainability of public finance, including the expected strains caused by the 
demographic changes ahead’. Moreover, it decided the policy response should be 
organised around three pillars:  
− reducing debt at a fast pace;  
− raising employment rates and productivity; and  
− reforming pension, health care and long-term care systems.  
Successive European Councils have recognised and confirmed the need to address the 
implications of ageing populations at European level. In November 2009, the Council 
stressed that making progress on each of these pillars is indispensable for appropriately 
addressing the sustainability challenge.4 In particular, it underlined the need to return to 
sustainable fiscal positions starting with the implementation of the agreed principles for 
the exit strategy endorsed by the Council (ECOFIN) in October 2009, and subsequently 
moving towards the medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs). The reduction in debt 
ratios would have to come from a combination of fiscal consolidation and structural 
reforms to support potential growth. The Council agreed that at the current juncture it is 
of particular importance to avoid that cyclical unemployment becomes entrenched. 
Moreover, regarding social protection systems, comprehensive and adequate reforms, 
notably of pension systems, can have a substantial positive impact on long-term 
sustainability and further progress is in the EU Member States. 
                                                 
4 See COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2972nd Council meeting, Economic and Financial 
Affairs, Brussels, 10 November 2009, 15572/09 (Presse 319).  
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1.2.3 The EU's fiscal framework; the Stability and Growth Pact  
The assessment of fiscal sustainability is with the 2005 reform of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) an integral part of the EU fiscal framework. According to the SGP, 
long-term issues should be given a prominent role in the EUs multilateral budgetary 
surveillance. Recently, Member States have agreed detailed principles on the revision of 
the medium-term budgetary objectives (MTO) in order to ensure that the Member 
States’ budgetary strategies reflect real medium-term needs, by taking account not just 
of debt levels but also implicit liabilities, notably costs related to ageing populations, in 
particular projected pension and healthcare expenditure. MTOs can be revised when a 
major structural reform with impact on the cost of ageing is implemented and in any 
case every four years preferably after a new set of projections is produced by the Ageing 
Working Group.5 
1.2.4 Enhancing consistency in concepts and methods in measuring 
adequacy and sustainability 
 
Mutual consideration of adequacy and sustainability 
The Social Protection Committee (SPC) through the Indicator Sub-Group (ISG) has 
primarily refined measurements of social adequacy while the Economic Policy 
Committee (EPC) through the Ageing Working Group (AWG) has primarily developed 
measurements of fiscal sustainability in relation to notably pension expenditure.  
At present, the AWG contributes to improve the quantitative assessment of the long-term 
sustainability of public finances and economic consequences of ageing populations, so as 
to assist policy formulation in the context of the SGP and the assessment of the annual 
Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCP). The ISG currently develops mainly 
indicators to monitor the common objectives on Social Protection and Social Inclusion in 
the framework of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). Since adequacy and 
sustainability are two sides of the same coin, methodological progress should aim at 
enhancing consistency in concepts and methods used by the SPC (ISG) and the EPC 
(AWG) while respecting their specific mandates and agreed procedures in addressing 
adequacy and sustainability.  
                                                 
5 Additionally, pension reforms are taken into account as relevant factor in the context of the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure. See also European Commission (2010), 'Public Finance Report 2010', forthcoming. 
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2 A decade of pension reform in the EU 
2.1 Major trends in reforms  
In both public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and private funded schemes entitlement has been 
ever closer linked to the length and the value of contributory records. 
First, even though the share will reduce, the bulk of pension income in most Member 
States will continue to be provided by public PAYG schemes. 
Second, reforms have brought several genuine innovations into scheme design. Whether 
through systemic transformations or a sequence of parametric reforms, Member States 
have to a large extent developed new hybrid designs. Typically, they have sought to 
incorporate the better features that used to distinguish public from private and PAYG 
from funded schemes.  
Minimum income provisions for older people and social protection aspects of pension 
systems have often been improved as schemes and the way they combine have been 
overhauled.  
Along the way earnings-related pension schemes have frequently also become fairer in 
their intra-generational consequences. Distributional aspects are often covered through 
minimum income provisions.  
Moreover, as many reforms have entailed improved coverage and better adaptation to 
changes in gender roles and labour markets they have had a positive bearing on overall 
adequacy and fit with labour market objectives. In this sense reforms have not just 
improved sustainability in terms of aggregate public budget impact. They have also 
contributed to improve adequacy as more people will benefit from pensions.  
In addition, reforms brought a whole range of innovations that in many constructive ways 
blurred the old dividing lines between PAYG/funded, public/private and 
voluntary/obligatory schemes by combining elements from both. As private prefunded 
pensions have been given a larger role in overall provision they have become subject to 
far more public scrutiny and regulation and their traditional social protection limitations 
(partial, regressively skewed coverage; lack of portability; access and vesting rules 
creating discretionary conditionality; regressive distributional effects) were increasingly 
reduced or corrected.  
A key type of innovation was the establishment of self-balancing mechanisms in the 
relation between liabilities and revenues, such as linking the contribution-benefit formula 
and/or the pensionable age to longevity and GDP/wage sum developments. This has 
added important measures of adaptability to schemes and increased their stability to the 
ultimate benefit of both social adequacy and financial sustainability concerns. 
When trying to review the balance of adequacy and sustainability in reform outcomes 
prior to the crisis, a picture emerges with an overall mix of trade offs, but also one 
showing important synergies in intra- and inter-generational win-win potentials. Reforms 
have also provided incentive for people to work more and longer to generate additional 
means of income. One important outcome would seem to be greater stability of schemes 
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in view of known challenges. Finally for some Member States major reforms will still be 
needed before they fit into this tentatively generalised picture. 
2.1.1 Strengthening of contributory principles 
From the early 1980’s to the early 1990’s the earnings-related, defined benefit schemes 
established by many MS in the 1950’s and 1960’s began maturing. There was also the 
extra cost of early retirement, in particular from additional groups which had been 
included in the schemes often at very good terms. Given that pension schemes were not 
designed to adapt to changing societal and demographic conditions, the primary policy 
response was often to increase the contribution rate. 
Since the mid-nineties securing adequacy and sustainability by adjusting liabilities to 
revenues and balancing entitlements far better with contributions became key underlying 
themes in reforming efforts: the transition from defined-benefit to defined-contribution 
entitlement formulas.  
Increasing the contribution period: from ‘best years’ to average life-time earnings in 
income-related schemes 
Tightening the link between contributions paid into the system and benefits paid out has 
been a key feature of reform efforts.  
Back in the 1980’s the big earnings-related public pension systems in Europe still tended 
to base their benefit calculations on income in a limited part of working careers, usually 
from as low as five to twenty years. Several countries have extended — or have 
embarked on the process of extending — the period of an individual’s earnings history 
that is used for calculating the pension entitlement in the statutory pension schemes.  
Basing pensions on a limited number of best or final years tends to be regressive, because 
the people with final or best years substantially above their lifetime average earnings tend 
to be those that earn the most. Moreover, in countries with a large informal sector they 
can give a large incentive to under-report earnings in earlier years and in others they may 
tend to reinforce systems of steep seniority-based pay.  
By moving from final pay or best years to life-time earnings as the basis for benefit 
calculation and by insisting on a number of contribution years instead of solely on 
reaching a pensionable age, pension schemes have become more equitable in their 
distributions between blue and white collar workers with steady employment. But as 
these changes have been made workers with periods of low income, broken careers and 
atypical work without (full) pension coverage have become more exposed, unless 
adequate crediting provisions are provided.  
Some countries have extended the qualifying period for a minimum pension in order to 
strengthen contributory principles and avoid that the effect of a minimum guarantee act 
as a disincentive to stay in the labour market.  
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Increasing the pensionable age 
In many Member States, there has been an equalisation of pensionable ages between 
women and men. Some Member States will see such an equalisation in the near future 
whilst others have longer transitional rules. Some have so far taken no steps in this 
direction. In some Member States the number of years required to receive a full pension 
was increased.  
Table 1 - Standard pension eligibility age and labour market exit age  
Member State 
Average 
exit age 
from the 
labour 
force in 
2001 
Average 
exit age 
from the 
labour 
force in 
2008 
Statutory 
retirement age 
for M/W in 
2009  
Statutory retirement age
for M/W in 2020 
Further 
increases 
in the 
statutory 
retirement age
for M/W 
after 2020 
Life 
expectancy at 
65 in 2008 
(unweighted 
average for 
two genders) 
Projected 
increase in life 
expectancy at 
65 between 
2008 and 2060 
(unweighted 
average for 
two genders)
Belgium 56,8 61,6* 65/65 65/65  18,3 5,1 
Bulgaria 58,4 61,5 63/60 63/60  14,6 6,9 
Czech 
Republic 58,9 60,6 62/60y8m 63y8m/63y4m 65/65 16,4 6,0 
Denmark 61,6 61,3 65/65 65/65 67+/67+*** 17,5 5,5 
Germany 60,6 61,7 65/65 65y9m/65y9m 67/67 18,5 5,1 
Estonia 61,1 62,1 63/61 63/63  15,6 6,5 
Ireland 63,2 64,1** 65/65 65/65 (66/66) (68/68) 18,2 5,6 
Greece 61,3° 61,4 65/60 65/60 65/65 18,4 4,9 
Spain 60,3 62,6 65/65 65/65  19,0 4,8 
France 58,1 59,3 60-65 60/60  19,9 4,5 
Italy 59,8 60,8 65/60 65/60**** *** 19,5 4,7 
Cyprus 62,3 63,5* 65/65 65/65  18,0 5,2 
Latvia 62,4 62,7 62/62 62/62  14,9 7,1 
Lithuania 58,9 59,9** 62y6m/60 64/63 65/65 15,3 6,7 
Luxembourg 56,8 : 65/65 65/65  18,3 5,1 
Hungary 57,6 : 62/62 64/64 65/65 15,5 6,8 
Malta 57,6 59,8 61/60 63/63 65/65 17,5 5,6 
Netherlands 60,9 63,2 65/65 65/65 (66/66) (67/67) 18,2 5,1 
Austria 59,2 60,9* 65/60 65/60 65/65 18,7 4,9 
Poland 56,6 59,3* 65/60 65/60  16,5 6,2 
Portugal 61,9 62,6* 65/65 65/65  18,1 5,1 
Romania 59,8 55.5 63y8m/58y8m 65/60 (65/61y11m) (65/65) 15,0 6,8 
Slovenia 56,6° 59,8** 63/61 63/61 (65/65)  17,6 5,5 
Slovakia 57,5 58,7* 62/59 62/62  15,2 6,8 
Finland 61,4 61,6* 65/65, 63-68 65/65, (64y8m-68) 65/65, (65-68) 18,6 4,9 
Sweden 62,1 63,8 61-67 61-67  18,9 4,8 
United 
Kingdom 62,0 63,1 65/60 65/65 68/68 18,2 5,4 
EU 27 
average 59,9 61,4    18,2 5,3 
Source: Eurostat, MISSOC, Ageing Report. 
Note: ° - 2002, * - 2007, ** - 2006, in brackets – proposed, not yet legislated, *** retirement age evolves in line with 
life expectancy gains over time, introducing flexibility in the retirement provision. **** For Italy 65/65 for civil 
servants, starting from 2018. 
Sweden: guarantee pension is available from the age of 65. 
Romania: the National House of Pensions and other Social Insurance Rights. 
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Several Member States have legislated an increase in the pensionable age for both 
genders. Yet in most of these countries the higher eligibility ages for a statutory pension 
will be phased in over a long period and have more effect on younger cohorts (see Table 
1). Despite the general trend towards increases in the pensionable age, there are Member 
States where the pension eligibility age is still relatively low.  
A number of Member States have strengthened the bonus-malus system in schemes with 
delayed and early retirement possibilities. Others have chosen to introduce flexible paths 
into retirement on an actuarial basis such as minimum pension eligibility age at which 
old-age pension benefits can be received and rules allowing individuals to take a share of 
their pension whilst continuing to work part-time.  
Experience shows that introducing more flexible retirement provision requires a careful 
design to ensure the desired results. If the structure of bonus/malus incentives and the 
focus on a proper target group of workers is badly designed, flexibility may lead to a 
shortening rather than an extension of working lives.6  
Key elements in reforms of early exit benefits7  
Early exit8 benefits have been the main element in the path out of the labour market. 
These include early retirement schemes for certain professions, unemployment and 
disability benefits, as well as long-term sickness benefits, supplementary pensions and 
survivors' pensions. Reforms that close or reduce the take-up of these benefits have 
contributed to longer working lives. The question Member States face is how to restrict 
the access to the benefits and how to design measures motivating recipients to take up 
work. In particular reforms have helped to achieve higher employment rates among those 
aged 55-59 and thus for older workers as a whole.  
Recent improvements in the employment situation of those aged 55-64  hide a growing 
divergence between different groups (men versus women, higher educated versus lower 
educated). Accordingly, further reforms of early exit routes should also aim to focus on 
groups with weak improvements in employment rate.  
2.1.2 Greater role for pre-funding9 
 
Greater pre-funding, in one form or another, has been a widespread policy response to the 
demographic challenge. In macro-economic terms, pre-funding means bringing forward 
some of the costs of the demographic shift to distribute them over a longer period and 
over different generations.  
Pre-funding has been enhanced in four ways:  
                                                 
6 More analysis in the SPC Study "Promoting longer working lives through pension reforms", 2007&2008, 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=752&langId=en&moreDocuments=yes . 
7 More in the 2008 SPC Study "Promoting longer working lives through pension reforms. Early exits from 
the labour market" http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=752&langId=en&moreDocuments=yes . 
8 Early exit schemes are to be seen as a special category of pathways out of the labour force different from 
the flexibility provided within some statutory pension schemes. 
9 A more detailed analysis of greater role of pre-funding is presented in the Annex 3. 
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• introduction of new defined-contribution (DC) schemes (either mandatory, with 
automatic enrolment or voluntary with tax incentives);  
• expansion of existing occupational schemes;  
• setting up of pension reserve funds; or,  
• paying down of national debt. 
The two first represent the most important changes as they imply that funded elements 
have been given an official role in over all national pension provision. It also means that 
many Member States have moved from a largely single pillar towards a truly multi-pillar 
pension system where retirement income will derive from a package of pension elements 
instead of a single benefit. 
Presently funded schemes only play a significant role in a few Member States. But as 
newly introduced schemes mature they are set to play a major role in the incomes of 
future pensioners in many countries across the Union (see Figure 3).  
Figure 3 - Share of occupational and statutory funded pensions in total gross replacement rates in 
2006 and 2046 in selected Member States 
 
Source: ISG 2009 report on Theoretical Replacement Rates 
Note: Data available only for a number of Member States 
Coverage levels of funded schemes vary greatly depending on the role of the scheme in 
the overall national pension system: statutory funded, occupational or voluntary pension 
provision. 
2.1.3 Establishment of automatic adjustment or periodic review 
mechanisms 
 
A number of countries have introduced mechanisms for automatic adjustment or periodic 
review (see Table 2). To a varying degree they link: 
− Life expectancy to pension eligibility or replacement rates, 
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− Economic performance in terms of GDP growth or labour market performance 
with valorisation of entitlements or indexation of benefits, 
− Balance of the system to valorisation of entitlements or indexation of benefits, 
− Contribution rates with indexation of benefits. 
The purpose of automatic adjustment mechanisms is to maintain the balance between 
revenues and liabilities in pension schemes, and intentionally or not, these mechanisms 
impact on both intergenerational adequacy and sustainability. These mechanisms imply 
that the financial costs of demographic changes will be shared between generations 
subject to a rule. Some of them tend to be pro-cyclical, so in times of crisis they can 
impose social cost, as in some cases they may affect retired people directly. 
Given demographic projections, adjustment mechanisms based on changes in life 
expectancy will have a considerable scope for application in the coming decades (see 
Table 2). The basic idea behind them is to transfer decision-making from the political 
arena to the realm of the law.  
Table 2 - Automatic adjustment mechanisms in income-related pension systems in Member States  
Variable Dependent value Member States 
Life expectancy Pension eligibility 
(pensionable age, required 
contribution period) 
DK, FR, IT 
 Replacement rate Mandatory DC (BG, EE, LV, 
LT, HU, PL, RO, SE), NDC 
(IT, LV, PL, SE), DE, PT, FI
GDP growth Indexation of benefits HU, PT 
GDP growth, labour market Valorisation of entitlements NDC (IT, LV, PL, SE) 
Balance of the system 
(labour market, fund's 
balance) 
Valorisation of entitlements SE 
 Indexation of benefits DE, SE, NL funded DB 
Contribution rate Indexation of benefits DE 
Source: Commission services 
Automatic adjustments of contribution rates or indexation are also applied in 
occupational funded pensions. These mechanisms have been stretched to the limit by the 
crisis and there may need to be some more fundamental changes notably around 
pensionable ages. But in general the mechanisms have been effective in sharing risk and 
re-balancing the pension schemes in a way that does not lead to scheme closures. 
2.1.4 Coverage, minimum income provision for older people and 
indexation  
Member States are using different types of provision and delivery mechanisms to ensure 
a minimum of adequacy in income streams for retired people:  
− Minimum pensions within contributory earnings-related pension schemes for 
people with low income or short contribution records.  
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− Basic flat-rate pensions that may be non-contributory or contributory and include 
years of residency in their qualifying criteria.  
− Separate social assistance-like, means tested benefits for older people with few or 
no other pension rights – often referred to as ‘Social Pensions’.  
Many Member States have reformed their minimum pensions, basic pensions or 
minimum income provision in significant ways. Improvements to benefit levels and 
access, and changes to up-rating and indexing mechanisms or ad-hoc increases were 
particularly frequent.10  
Valorisation and indexation of pensions 
Valorisation (pre-retirement indexation) and indexation (of retirement benefits) are both 
closely linked. All countries revalue earnings from earlier years to the time of retirement 
when calculating benefits. This mechanism adjusts for changes in costs and standards of 
living between the time pension rights were earned and when they are claimed. 
Valorisation of past earnings impact on replacement rates and fiscal sustainability in 
major ways. This is a result of the compound-interest effect.  
Many EU countries with earnings-related schemes valorise past earnings in line with 
economy-wide wage growth. However, several countries have moved away from 
earnings valorisation in recent years and they valorise earnings to price inflation or a mix 
of price inflation and earnings growth.  
Changes in the indexation11 of pensions during retirement have featured in many reform 
packages. Therefore replacement rates of the year of retirement explain only partially the 
adequacy of the pension system because they do not cover the decrease of the 
replacement rates during the pensioners' life in case of price indexation. Some countries 
have introduced 'sustainability factors' in the pension award linked to demographic 
developments (e.g. DE, SE), or use above-inflation rises in pension payments only if 
economic growth is rapid (e.g. HU, PT). The indexation issue can be viewed as a choice 
between a lower initial pension combined with earnings indexation and a higher starting 
benefit combined with price indexation. A majority of countries in the EU relies on 
indexation rules for pensions that do not fully reflect development in nominal wages (see 
Table 3).  
                                                 
10 More in the 2006 SPC study "Minimum income provision for older people and their contribution to 
adequacy in retirement" 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/docs/social_protection/SPC%20Study%20minimum%20incom
e%20final.pdf 
11 Detailed presentation of indexation rules in EU Member States can be found in the Annex 2.  
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Table 3 - Indexation of income-related pensions in Member States  
Variable Member States 
Wage growth SI, DK and SE 
Wage growth and change in pensioner-
contributor-relation 
DE 
Prices and wages BG, CZ, EE, CY,  LU, HU, PL, FI, and SK, 
MT, RO 
Prices BE, ES, FR, IT LV, AT  and UK 
Prices and GDP growth (partially) PT 
Discretionary EL, LT, IE and AT 
Progressive EL, IT,  and PT 
Source: 2009Ageing Report, Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2009.  
Note: Belgium: prices + partial adjustment to living standards.  
Some countries have introduced progressive indexation of their pensions, where the 
increases granted to smaller pensions are larger. Also, ad hoc adjustments have been 
made to indexation rules. In some cases, this appears to operate in a procyclical way: 
pension increases are larger than the rules require when the public finances are healthy 
while increases are postponed or reduced in times of fiscal constraint.  
2.1.5 Increasing complexity of pension systems and the pension 
package 
 
Pension systems have become far more complex than they used to be as pensions have 
become based more on contributions from more pillars and new incentive structures have 
been introduced. Pension reforms have also meant a transfer of risk from pension scheme 
sponsors to the beneficiaries. More decisions by the individual beneficiary concerning 
time of retirement and investment choice is often now necessary to secure an adequate 
income in old age. This is because of increasing links between contributions and benefits, 
introduction of automatic adjustment mechanisms, and a transition to more individually 
funded pension provisions, require more decisions. This type of reforms has already been 
implemented in most EU Member States. Pension scheme members should be better 
furnished with reliable, intelligible information, but this should not be expected to 
transform them into experts. In this perspective, some countries provide detailed 
information, including estimations of pensions, to individuals. Best practice in the UK 
pensions industries is heading towards designing suitable default funds, recognising that 
most people in DC plans are 'accidental investors' who do not have the interest or 
inclination to actively manage their pension funds.  
2.1.6 Supporting pension reforms by labour market measures12 
 
                                                 
12 A more detailed analysis of developments in the labour markets between 2000 and 2008 is presented in 
the Annex 4. 
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Labour market measures intended to complement pension policies have included attempts 
to increase the effective exit age by way of increased pensionable age as well as efforts to 
curb early retirement and inactivity. Other measures have included legislation on labour 
contracts and employment protection.  
The incentives to participate in the labour market and to search actively for a job are 
determined partly by benefit systems and changes to tax/benefit structures have played a 
large role in Member State efforts to increase employment.  
The average seniority of an average person retiring in 2006 (non-contributory periods 
included) was lower than 30 years in DK, EL, MT, PT, and SI, and higher than 40 years 
in CZ, EE, and LU.13. These numbers show that the average working years are very often 
far below what is needed in many Member States to receive the maximum pension 
possible. 
A key driver of pension expenditure is the average age at which people exit from the 
labour market and start drawing a pension. Labour market attachment among older 
persons varies widely across the EU. Even if the evolution of the labour force differs 
from one country to another, it is possible to identify some common stylised facts which 
can be summarised as follows: 
− the participation rates of prime-age male workers (aged 25 to 54 years), at around 
90%, remain the highest of all groups; 
− in contrast, the participation rates of men aged 55 to 64 years have declined 
steadily in the past decades, but there are signs of reversal in many countries since 
the turn of the century;  
− the participation rates of women have steadily increased over the past 25 years; 
− the participation rates of young people (aged 15 to 24 years) have declined, 
mostly due to longer education; 
− looking forward, the increasing share of older workers in the labour force could 
put downward pressure on the overall participation rate. 
Given these trends, the main drivers of future changes in the overall participation rate, in 
addition to changes in the age composition of the population, are changes in the labour 
force attachment of prime-aged women, older workers (especially men) and, to a lesser 
extent, young people.  
2.2 Reform outcomes assessed by indicators and 
measurements of adequacy 
In line with the commonly agreed EU objectives on pensions the performance of pension 
systems should be assessed in relation to the interlinked, key dual social and financial 
objectives of adequacy and sustainability.  
 
                                                 
13 For more detailed information see the report "Updates of current and prospective theoretical pension 
replacement rates 2006-2046",  
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=752&newsId=551&furtherNews=yes 
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BOX: Indicators of adequacy and relative income of the elderly 
Presently there are a number of indicators in use to measure of the relative income of the 
elderly: 
ISG indicators  
− Theoretical replacement ratio: This is an ISG indicator to measure the impact of 
new pension policies.  The base case calculates the retirement pension received by a 
hypothetical person (male) working a full working life (40 contribution years) 
retiring at 65 accumulating pension rights under the new pension scheme and 
divides it by the projected wage in the immediate previous time period.  This ratio 
is compared with the same theoretical ratio today for someone who would have 
accumulated pension rights under today’s pension. It measures how reformed 
pension systems change future pension entitlements. It covers public pensions and 
mandatory private schemes, as well as private schemes that are considered to play a 
significant role in the future.  
− Aggregate replacement ratio: is defined as median individual pensions of 65-74 
year olds relative to median individual earnings of 50-59 year olds, excluding other 
social benefits. This is relevant to monitor current adequacy and the actual 
contribution of pensions to the replacement of earnings.  
− Median relative income of elderly people reflects equivalised (the indicator takes 
into account household composition) household income and is relevant to measure 
the overall income situation of older people relative to the active population.  
AWG indicators  
− The 'Benefit ratio' is the average benefit of: (i) public pension; and, (ii) public and 
private pensions, respectively, as a share of the economy-wide average wage (gross 
wages and salaries in relation to employees). Public pensions used to calculate the 
Benefit Ratio includes old-age, early pensions and Other pensions (disability and 
survivors), 
− The 'Gross Average Replacement Rate' is calculated as the average first 
retirement pension as a share of the economy-wide average wage, reported by 
Member States in the 2009 long-term projection exercise.14 Public pensions used to 
calculate the Gross Average Replacement Rate only includes old-age and early 
retirement pensions. 
 
                                                 
14 See European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) "2009 Ageing Report: Economic 
and budgetary projections for the EU-27 Member States (2008-2060), European Economy, No 2. 
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2.2.1 Developments in current adequacy and relative income of the 
elderly 
The indicators of current adequacy can measure how pension systems play their roles of 
poverty alleviation (at-risk-of-poverty of older people) and income smoothing (aggregate 
replacement ratio and relative median income of older people).  
The at-risk-of-poverty for older people in the EU-27 (19% in 2008 for the population 
aged 65+) is slightly higher than for younger cohorts (16% in 2008 for the population 
aged 0-64). Looking in more detail at the levels of poverty risk for older people, 
substantial differences exist between Member States, also as far as effectiveness of 
pension expenditure is concerned (Figure 4). However, the poverty risk of older people 
may be somewhat overestimated, only monetary income (notably deriving from 
pensions) is taken into account to evaluate the relative position of older people. The 
wealth of pensioners, particularly house ownership (and associated imputed rents) and 
private savings, which have a strong effect on the income distribution of pensioners, are 
not taken into account, nor are other non-monetary benefits (free health care, transport, 
etc.).  
A number of Member States manage to achieve relatively low at-risk-of-poverty rates of 
people aged 65 and more, together with restricted pension expenditure (see Figure 4). It 
might be a result of rather egalitarian character and strong redistributive features of 
pension systems currently in the pay-out phase, but also quite favourable current 
demographic situation.  
Another group of Member States with relatively low pension expenditure and high at-
risk-of-poverty rates have witnessed a considerable increase in pensioners' poverty in 
recent years. This might be due to ageing, relatively low pension entitlements, benefits 
indexed on prices or a mix of prices and wage indices, or fast economic growth, which 
during boom years benefited mainly people of active age. 
In the EU-15 the elderly (65+) have a higher risk-of-poverty rate than both children and 
working age population (20% against respectively 18% and 15% between 2005 and 
2008), while in 2005 in the EU-10 accession Member States pensioners experienced 
much lower risks of poverty than children and the working age population (8% against 
25% and 17% respectively).  This reflects partly the age orientation of social protection 
in these countries where pensions used to appear relatively generous compared to weak 
support to families with children. However, between 2005 and 2008 the relative situation 
of the elderly in the EU-10 has evolved rapidly, with the elderly at-risk-of-poverty rate 
increasing by 4 percentage points. 
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Figure 4 - At-risk-of-poverty rate of people aged 65+ and pension expenditure in EU Member States 
in 2007  
 
Source: Eurostat EU-SILC, ESSPROS 
Note: Expenditure covers both means-tested and non means- tested old age, partial, disability, early 
retirement, and survivors' pensions. At risk of poverty rate defined as with cut-off point of 60% of median 
equivalised income after social transfers. 
In analysing effectiveness of pension expenditure in reducing poverty, one needs to take 
into account the fact that in some Member States elderly people are provided with free or 
subsidised social services.  
A key factor affecting the poverty reducing effect of pensions is the coverage of different 
groups. In 2007 the at-risk-of-poverty rate in the EU-27 was at 16% for men and 22% for 
women aged 65 or more. In seven Member States the difference was higher than 10 pp. 
Only in MT and NL men aged 65 and more are more exposed to poverty than women.  
Besides addressing poverty, pension systems play a role in allowing retirees to maintain 
living standards comparable to those achieved during their working lives. The aggregate 
replacement ratios are an indicator of income maintenance after retirement. Based on 
individual income from pensions, they generally show that current average pension levels 
are reaching around 49% of current earnings on average. This can be due to low coverage 
and/or low income replacement from statutory pension schemes, but can also reflect 
maturing pension systems and incomplete careers or under-declaration of earnings in the 
past.15  
                                                 
15  In this respect, it should be noted that the aggregate replacement ratio indicator is based on gross 
income figures, and that several factors besides aggregate replacement rates (such as differences in 
household composition and size and the overall design of social protection and taxation systems) can have 
a strong influence on the overall living standards of individuals. 
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On average in the EU-27, the aggregate replacement ratio is lower for women than for 
men (49% vs. 53% in 2007). This gender gap, however, is not as substantial as in the case 
of at-risk-of-poverty rates. In fourteen Member States the value of the ratio for women 
exceeds that for men. 
The higher gender gap in at-risk-of-poverty rate than in the aggregate replacement ratio 
might be explained by several factors. First, in the majority of Member States pension 
benefits are indexed to prices or a combination of prices and wage indexation. In 
consequence, benefits for older pensioners can substantially lag behind wage 
developments, and women constitute the majority of older pensioners. Second, due to 
low female labour market participation in the past many elderly women have not built up 
personal pension entitlements, or they may not be entitled to survivors' pensions. 
Median relative income of elderly people compares situation of people aged 65 and more 
to the situation of those aged 0-64, reflects equivalised (the indicator takes into account 
household composition) household income and is relevant to reflect the overall income 
situation of older people. In 2007 the value of the median relative income ranged between 
54% in LV and 100% in HU.  
2.2.2 Developments in future adequacy 
Theoretical Replacement Rates 2008-2048 
Theoretical Replacement Rates developed by the Indicators Subgroup of the Social 
Protection Committee are defined as a level of pension income in the first year after 
retirement as a percentage of individual earnings at the moment of pension take-up and 
are calculated for an assumed hypothetical worker (in the so-called "base-case" 
scenario).16 In order not to misinterpret the results it is thus vital to consider theoretical 
replacement rates with the associated information on representativeness and the 
assumptions used in the calculation. The choice of specific common assumptions about 
the hypothetical worker, such as the age of retirement and the length of the contributory 
period before retirement, inevitably imply that only a share of individuals are actually 
represented by this career scenario.  
Given the assumptions described in the previous section for the calculations of theoretical 
replacement rates in the "base-case", fourteen Member States display results where 
reforms of statutory schemes would lead to a decrease of replacement rates between 2006 
and 2046. This is for a worker with average earnings retiring at 65 after 40 years (see 
Figure 5, displaying the change in replacement rates from the current situation to the 
prospective situation). This is most probably a reflection of reforms that have lowered 
future benefit levels at a fixed retirement age in order to cope with increasing longevity 
and the expenditure it would otherwise entail. These reforms entailed extension of 
contribution periods and increases in pensionable ages (see chapter 2.1.1), or introduction 
                                                 
16 Assumptions used in calculation of TRR (e.g. "base-case": male worker, earnings of average wage 
constant over his fulltime 40 years career, retiring at 65, etc) as well as more detailed analysis are presented 
in the Annex 5. 
For more detailed information see the report "Updates of current and prospective theoretical pension 
replacement rates 2006-2046",  
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=752&newsId=551&furtherNews=yes 
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of automatic adjustment mechanisms (see chapter 2.1.3). For other group of Member 
States there seem to be no significant changes in their replacement rates between 2006 
and 2046, and a last group of countries, where in major part TRR were relatively low in 
2006, may actually observe their replacement rates rise as a result of recent reforms that 
would be fully in place by 2046. 
Theoretical replacement rates are also calculated for variant cases, for instance for 
workers with different earnings and career profiles (see Annex 5). One should recall that 
coverage of private pensions included in the calculations are in some cases less than 
universal.  
Figure 5 - Change in the Theoretical Replacement Rates between 2006 and 2046 (in p.p.) 
 
Source: 2009 ISG report "Updates of current and prospective theoretical pension replacement rates 2006-
2046". 
Note: For countries with a projected drop in replacement rates it should be noted that the decrease can 
usually be counterbalanced by working longer. 
For workers with low earnings, mandatory schemes tend to have a more significant role 
in replacement income. Gross replacement rates are thus usually higher than for average 
earners. This reflects the fact that most countries attempt to protect low income workers 
from old-age poverty especially in the statutory pension schemes.  
Nevertheless, regarding the evolution of replacement rates between 2006 and 2046, the 
decline is in many cases of a comparable magnitude (as expressed in percentage points) 
for a low wage earner and an average one. Moreover, for some Member States where 
contribution-benefit links have been strengthened, the evolution of theoretical 
replacement rates appears to be very significantly less favourable for lower wages than 
for average wages.  
On the other extreme, in almost all Member States those with a higher earnings profile 
display significantly lower replacement rates compared with average earners. Ceilings on 
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replacement rates, which often exist in statutory pension schemes, strengthen their 
redistributive character.  
Studying the variant case of workers ten years after leaving employment shows how the 
value of benefits relative to prices and wages is maintained over time. According to the 
calculations replacement rates fall significantly in all but a few Member States. This 
clearly reflects the wide use of less than earnings indexation in Member States.  
According to current legislation the retirement age in 2046 for women will still be 
different to that for men in some Member States. In all of these countries due to shorter 
female careers the gross and net replacement rate results are lower for women than for 
men, even without taking into account the implication of probable differences in average 
earnings that may exist between men and women. 
Variants of shorter and longer careers are also considered by comparing a base case 
worker who retires at 65 with one that retires at 63 or at 67. The dynamics of bonus-
malus work incentives show that in most Member States delaying retirement results in 
higher theoretical replacement rates, while earlier retirement usually results in lower 
replacement rates. In all but a few Member States the increments in pensions for 
prolonged working lives are higher than the fall in replacement rates with earlier 
retirement. 
Studying to what extent pension entitlements are protected against the current loss of 
income due to career breaks such as care responsibilities or unemployment  are also 
important as the number of contributory years needed for a full pension has been 
extended in many Member States.  
In many Member States, absences from the labour market for childcare are often 
protected to a certain extent for the first years of absence. In a few countries extra 
pension entitlements following the birth of a child are provided, which means that even if 
no actual period of childcare leave is taken, the pension will still be greater than for 
women with no children. In another few Member States the drop in the replacement rate 
is negligible, but there are also a number of countries where child care years can result in 
a drop in replacement rates. 
In most Member States unemployment breaks lead to drops in replacement rates, 
showing bigger drops the longer the break. In extreme cases longer unemployment 
periods can result in lowered replacement income as contributions are lost. The drops are 
generally more important in funded DC systems than in DB systems, where protection for 
unemployment periods is provided in the pension system. 
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Future developments in the benefit ratio 
The 'benefit ratio' is the average benefit of public (or public and private) pension, as a 
share of the economy-wide average wage (gross wages and salaries in relation to 
employees) used by the Ageing Working Group of the Economic Policy Committee. In 
contrast to the TRR which project future situation of a hypothetical individual worker, 
benefit ratios are calculated on the basis of macro data, so reflect averages (for more 
details on the difference between indicators, see the Box: Differences between measures 
of replacement rates and benefit ratios).  
Table 4 shows the benefit ratio and the replacement rate (the average first pension as a 
share of the economy-wide average wage) as in the AWG projections.17  
Sizable decreases in benefit ratios are projected over coming decades. The decline in the 
public pension benefit ratio over the period 2008 to 2060 is substantial, 20% or more in 
eleven Member States. However, the decline in the total pension benefit ratio is smaller 
in several countries when the projected support from supplementary pension schemes, is 
considered, see also Table 4.18  
In the case of a declining benefit ratio over time, the replacement rates at retirement 
provides information on whether the reduction in average pension benefit over time is 
due to a decline over time in newly awarded pensions (as reflected in the replacement 
rate at retirement), or due to a decline in previously awarded 'old' pensions relative to 
wages, the latter being influenced by the pension indexation rule employed. Volumes of 
new entrants and drop-outs can also have an influence. The theoretical replacement rates 
and the benefit ratio are not directly comparable (see the Box: Differences between 
replacement rates and benefit ratios).  
                                                 
17 The average wage (the denominator of the benefit ratio) is calculated as a ratio of gross wages and 
employed persons (both employees and self-employed) of age 15 to 71 years.  
18 It should be noted that not all Member States were in a position to provide projection for supplementary 
schemes even if they exist, indicating that the total benefit ratio is not fully comparable. 
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Table 4 - Benefit ratios and replacement rates (in %)  
 
2007 2060 % change 2007 2060 % change 2007 2060 % change 2007 2060 % change
BE 45 43 -4 45 42 -7
BG 44 36 -20 44 41 -8 36 49
CZ 45 38 -17 33 27 -17 33 27 -17
DK 39 38 -4 64 75 17 33 33 0 71 84 18
DE 51 42 -17
EE 26 16 -40 26 22 -18 28 16 -41 28 31 9
IE 27 32 16
EL 73 80 10 61 67 10
ES 58 52 -10 62 57 -8
FR 63 48 -25
IT 68 47 -31 67 49 -26
CY 54 57 5
LV 24 13 -47 24 25 4 33 22 -33 33 33 2
LT 33 28 -16 33 32 -2 32 29 -10 32 37 15
LU 46 44 -4 46 44 -4 53 62 17
HU 39 36 -8 39 38 -3 49 38 -23 49 43 -13
MT 42 40 -6
NL 44 41 -7 74 81 10
AT 55 39 -30 49 38 -22
PL 56 26 -54 56 31 -44
PT 46 33 -29 47 33 -31 58 56 -3
RO 29 37 26 29 41 41 36 44 20 36 49 34
SI 41 39 -6 41 40 -2
SK 45 33 -27 45 40 -11
FI 49 47 -5
SE 49 30 -39 64 46 -27 49 31 -36
UK 35 37 7
NO 51 47 -8
Benefit Ratio (%) Gross Average Replacement Rate (%)
Public pensions Public and private pensions Public pensions Public and private pensions
 
Source: Commission services, EPC. 
Note: The 'Benefit ratio' is the average benefit of public pension and public and private pensions, 
respectively, as a share of the economy-wide average wage (gross wages and salaries in relation to 
employees), as calculated by the Commission. The 'Gross Average Replacement Rate' is calculated as the 
average first pension as a share of the economy-wide average wage, as reported by the Member States in 
the pension questionnaire. Public pensions used to calculate the Benefit Ratio includes old-age and early 
pensions and other pensions, while public pensions used to calculate the Gross Average Replacement Rate 
only includes old-age and early pensions. Private pensions are not included for all Member States. Hence, 
the comparability of the figures is limited. In general, the old-age and early pensions are the major part of 
pension expenditure, so this difference is unlikely to affect the results substantially. The benefit ratio and 
the gross average replacement rate convey different information. In particular, due to differences in wage 
concepts used when calculating the benefit ratio and the replacement rate, the two indicators (and in 
specially their level) are not strictly comparable and should be interpreted with caution. The value of 
indicators might change as some Member States consider reforms of their pension systems (e.g. Ireland). 
Only about half of the Member States have reported replacement rates, which hampers a 
mapping of the situation across the EU. Nonetheless, substantial declines in the public 
pension replacement rate between 2007 and 2060 suggest that the valorisation of the 
average first pension is lagging behind the average wage growth quite significantly (also 
as a result of automatic adjustments, e.g. "sustainability factors" – see Chapter 2.1.3).  
However, it must be borne in mind that other sources of income for older people can 
make up for the lower initial pension from public schemes (income from supplementary 
schemes, drawing down on accumulated assets and savings).  
 
Box: Differences between measures of replacement rates and benefit ratios 
There are a number of factors that explain the difference in the magnitude of the change 
over time of the pension benefit in relation to earnings: 
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• The concepts of the indicators are different: The benefit ratio is defined as the 
average pension in relation to the average wage at time t. The theoretical replacement rate 
is defined as the first retirement pension at time t in relation to the last wage at time t-1 
for a representative, hypothetical person (male worker) with a typical career (40 years). 
There are several underlying differences in the methodologies to compute these two 
measures of adequacy. First, the benefit ratio measures the average pension comprising 
all pensions, both new and old, thus covering several cohorts. As such, it captures the 
evolution of pension after retirement, which depends on how the pension benefit is 
updated (the indexation regime). Second, the benefit ratio includes all pension benefits 
and all features that affect the value of pension contributions (e.g. crediting for maternity 
leave, higher education…). Third, the benefit ratio measures real careers, as opposed to a 
hypothetical one, and their changes over time. These factors contribute to the larger 
decline in the benefit ratio than in the theoretical replacement rate in the long term. 
• The projection period is different: The projection period for the benefit ratio is 
2007-2060, while for the theoretical replacement rate it is 2006-2046. Aligning the period 
over which developments are measured reduces the difference between the indicators. 
• The coverage of the pension benefits is different: The benefit ratio includes all 
public pensions (e.g. old-age, early and disability pension) and, where available, private 
pensions. The theoretical replacement rate includes old-age and early public pensions as 
well as mandatory private pillars and some other private pensions when these schemes 
are projected to play a significant role. Aligning the coverage of the indicators reduces 
the difference between the indicators. The projections in the 2009 Ageing Report show 
that 'other pensions' (disability…) are virtually constant s a share of GDP over the 
projection period. 
• Gender differences are reflected in benefit ratios and not in theoretical 
replacement rates: as a result benefit ratios are lower.  
In sum, the differences between the two indicators, and in particular, the larger reduction 
in the long-term in the benefit ratio compared to the theoretical replacement rates at 
aggregate level for the EU27, can be attributed to:  
• The general trend in EU Member States increasing reliance on price indexation of 
pension after retirement. This usually leads to 'old' pensions – though remaining constant 
in real terms - rising slower than wages. In turn, when theoretical replacement rates are 
calculated ten years after retirement they also show a significant fall compared to the year 
of retirement, thus reflecting indexation by prices only (or by less than earnings) and thus 
getting closer to the calculations for the benefit ratio. Moreover, the benefit ratio relies on 
'real' careers and contributory periods and not hypothetical ones.  
• The theoretical replacement rate projections end up in 2046. On the other hand the 
projections in the 2009 Ageing Report reveal that the decline in the benefit ratio 
continues up to 2060 (decreasing by 6.5 p.p. by 2046 and by 8.5 p.p. by 2060). 
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2.3 Reform outcomes assessed by measurements of 
sustainability 
2.3.1 The impact of pension reforms on labour market participation 
Pension reforms can have a substantial impact on labour market performance, depending 
on the specific design of the reform. A particularly interesting feature is to analyse the 
extent to which pension reforms alters the average retirement age.19 
The analysis in the 2009 Ageing Report takes into account the potential effect of recent 
pension reforms on the participation rates of older workers.20 The expected postponement 
of retirement is summarised by the difference in the average exit age from the labour 
force in 2060 (see Figure 6).  
Figure 6 - Impact of pension reforms on the average exit age from the labour force 
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Source: Commission services, EPC 
Figure 7 shows the estimated impact of pension reforms on participation rates. According 
to the projection, pension reforms would have a sizeable impact on the labour market 
participation of older workers in most of the Member States which plan the 
implementation of enacted pension reforms. A stronger impact is expected from changes 
in the parameters affecting the statutory age of retirement. Overall, in the EU, the 
participation rate of older people (55-64) is estimated to be about 8 p.p. higher in 2020 
                                                 
19 For a detailed account of pension reforms which impact has been incorporated in the projections, and for 
recent pension reforms enacted after July 2008, see Annex 6. 
20 The findings of an international research project based on micro-estimation results are clear: changing 
pension plan provisions would have large effects on the labour participation of older workers, see Gruber 
and Wise (2005). The reforms taken into account are recently enacted in 20 EU Member States and include 
measures to be phased in gradually. Some countries have enacted legislation to increase the statutory 
retirement age for women or for both men and women. Others have changed provisions of social security 
programmes (and sometimes of other transfer programmes used as alternative early retirement paths) that 
provided strong incentives to leave the labour force at an early age. The information was provided by the 
Members of the EPC and AWG. For details on the pension reforms incorporated in the baseline scenario, 
see European Commission–EPC (2008). 
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and 13 p.p. higher in 2060 due to the impact of pension reforms. In the euro area, the 
impact is estimated to be slightly larger, at about 9 p.p. in 2020 and 13.5 p.p. 2060, 
respectively. 
Figure 7 - Estimated impact of pension reform on participation rates (2060), in percentage points 
(comparison of projections with and without incorporating recent pension reforms) 
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Source: Commission services, EPC 
In the EU as a whole, the average exit age from the labour market was 62.2 for males and 
61.3 for females in 2008.21 By 2060, this is projected to have risen to 63.8 and 63.3 
respectively, in part due to the reforms enacted (see Table 5). This implies an increase in 
the share of adult life spent in retirement, from 23% to 26% for males, and from 27% to 
30% for females. In order to keep the share of adult life spent in retirement constant at its 
2008 level, the average exit age would need to rise by an additional two to three years. A 
priori, there is no economic rationale for favouring a constant share of adult life spent in 
retirement, and indeed a preference for a longer period of leisure time in retirement could 
be justified on the basis of rising living standards. However, retirement decisions need be 
economically and financially viable. 
Table 5 - Ageing problem or retirement problem? 
 
                                                 
21 The average exit age in Table 5 is calculated with the cohort simulation model used in the 2009 Ageing 
Report and does not exactly match the exit age in Table 1 (Eurostat structural indicator).  
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2.3.2 Pension expenditure projections 
Effect of reforms on public pension expenditure22 
For the EU, the projections show an increase in the public pension expenditures of 
2.4 p.p. of GDP over the period 2007-2060 (2.8 p.p. of GDP for the euro area). The lion’s 
share of the projected increase in public pension expenditure is due to the increase in old-
age and early pensions (projected to increase by 2.4 p.p. of EU GDP between 2007 and 
2060). A smaller increase is projected for other expenditure, mainly disability and 
survivor pensions, increasing only slightly by 0.1 p.p. of GDP in the euro area.  
Figure 8 - Gross old-age and other public pension expenditure in 2007 and 2060 (% of GDP) 
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Source: Commission services, EPC. 
Note: The definitions of Old-age and Other pensions are provided in the 2009 Ageing Report. 
Definitions used in the projections: 
France: Disability pensions for individuals below a retirement age are included in health-care expenditure. After the 
minimum retirement age (60) disability pensions are covered by the public pension scheme. Survivors' pensions for all 
age are covered by the public pension expenditures. 
UK: Benefits paid to disabled persons below state pension age are not included in the projection, but disability benefits 
for persons above state pension age are included in public pension expenditure. The UK does not have survivor 
pensions. 
Ireland: "Old-age and other public pension expenditure" includes in addition the pension expenditure of public service 
occupational pension schemes. 
Hungary: The Economic Policy Committee endorsed the projection of public pension expenditure in Hungary 
incorporating the 2009 pension reform at their 22 February 2010 meeting. According to the revised pension projections, 
public pension expenditure is projected to decrease from 10.9% of GDP in 2007 to 10.5% of GDP in 2060, i.e. by 0.4 
p.p. of GDP, compared with the projection in the 2009 Ageing Report, where an increase of 3 p.p. of GDP between 
2007 and 2060 was projected. The projection of old-age and early pensions include an estimation of old-age allowance 
(social allowance for people who have not acquired pension rights). 
In three Member States (EL, CY, and LU) public pension expenditure is projected to 
increase by more than 10 p.p. of GDP. In another five Member States (IE, ES, MT, RO, 
SI) spending is projected to grow between 5 to 10 p.p. In case of DK, EE, IT, LV, PL, 
HU and SE the ratio either stays at or drops down below the initial (2007) level. For the 
majority of the Member States the change of the ratio is below 5 p.p.. Spending on 
                                                 
22 An analysis of current pension expenditure is presented in the Annex 7. 
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disability and survivor pensions are projected to decrease in the majority of countries. 
Only in seven Member States (PT, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE, and UK) is it projected to 
increase, although only slightly. 
Effect of reforms on private pensions  
As presented in Chapter 2.1.4, the role of privately managed pension schemes is currently 
rather limited and the major part of pension income is provided by public pension 
schemes. But, as shown in Figure 9, the provision of pension income by private pension 
funds is expected to increase in the future.23 
In general, net contributions to occupational and private pension funds are increasing 
over time and the most of occupational and private funds are still “a long way” from 
being mature funds. In other words, at this moment there are only a few countries with 
large numbers of pensioners or people who will retire soon and will rely to a substantial 
part on funded pensions. Thus, in most cases, contributions to the private funds continue 
to exceed drawings from now-retired members, meaning there should be no need for the 
funds to liquidate under current difficult conditions any of their investments and sell 
assets at reduced prices. Figure 10 shows the value of accumulated assets in both 
occupational and private pension schemes in 2007 and 2060 as projected by some of the 
Member States.  
Figure 9 - Expenditure of non-public occupational, private mandatory and non-mandatory pension 
(% of GDP) 
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Source: Commission services, EPC. 
Note: The graph presents only the countries which provided data for other pension schemes and its value is 
non zero. The graph is thus not comprehensive; private pensions may exist in a country, but it was not 
possible to provide a projection. In Slovakia, the private pension pillar changed from mandatory to 
voluntary in 2008. 
 
                                                 
23 Due to a lack of information concerning development of occupational and private schemes, only a few 
countries provided a projection of relevant variables. 
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Figure 10 - Occupational, private mandatory and non-mandatory pension assets (% of GDP) 
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Source: Commission services, EPC. 
Note: The graph presents only the countries that provided data for other pension schemes. 
 
Drivers of pension expenditure 
Figure 11 shows the pension to GDP increases in Member States over the whole 
projection horizon (2007 – 2060). In some cases the ratio of future expenditure can be 
pushed downwards due to a shift from public schemes towards private mandatory 
schemes.24 
                                                 
24 In the case of Luxembourg, the pension projection is affected by the considerable number of cross border 
workers who will in the future years receive a pension from the Luxembourg social security scheme, but at 
the same time will not be registered as Luxembourg inhabitants. Due to this peculiar circumstance, 
Luxembourg can not be, in same cases, strictly compared with other Member States. Thus, in some of our 
analysis Luxembourg is treated as an outlier. Whenever the conclusions seem to be affected by country 
specific situation, this is highlighted in the text. 
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Figure 11 - Change in the Public Pension/GDP over 2007-60 (in percentage points) 
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Source: Commission services, EPC. Hungary reformed its pension system in 2009. Following the reform, its impact 
was assessed through a peer review by the AWG, and endorsed by the EPC at their 22 February 2010 meeting. 
According to the revised pension projections, public pension expenditure is projected to decrease from 10.9% of GDP 
in 2007 to 10.5% of GDP in 2060, i.e. by 0.4 p.p. of GDP, compared with the projection in the 2009 Ageing Report, 
where an increase of 3 p.p. of GDP between 2007 and 2060 was projected.  
In order to shed light on the main drivers behind these dynamics, the decomposition of 
pension expenditure to GDP into its main components is outlined in the Annex 8.  
In general, at the EU27 level, the effect of demographic factor – as captured by the 
dependency ratio (the ratio between persons aged 65 and over and persons aged 15-64) – 
is the most relevant in pushing up spending, although it is decreasing over time as from 
2030 (Figure 12). The largest contribution is envisaged for the periods 2007-2030, 
reaching +2.3 p.p. At the end of the projection (2050-2060), the contribution of 
demographic factors levels down to +0.7 p.p. of GDP. Significant differences can be 
found among Member States. Especially, idiosyncratic demographic developments are 
expected for EU10 and EU15 countries.  
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The contribution of the coverage ratio (the ratio between the number of pensioners and 
persons aged 65 and over) at EU27 level is expected to fade away over the projection 
horizon. The initial downward contribution (-1.1 p.p.) of the 2007-2020 period is 
estimated to subsequently fall down over the projection period towards zero (-0.2 p.p.). 
The contribution of the employment effect is noticeable during the period 2007-20, 
contributing to limit the increase by -0.5 p.p., and its contribution subsequently vanishes 
in the period 2020-30. Finally, the contribution of the benefit ratio development at the 
EU27 level to containing spending is envisaged to increase in absolute terms from the 
initial level (-0.1 p.p.) in 2007-2020 to its maximum value in 2030-2040 (-0.7 p.p.).  
Figure 12 - Decomposition of the public pension spending to GDP ratio over sub periods for EU27 (in 
percentage points) 
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Source: Commission services, EPC. 
The 2009 Ageing Report presents the third round of expenditure projections in the EU 
Member States (after the 2001 and 2006 rounds). The 2009 revisions of projected 
changes in pension expenditure over the long term are due to several factors, notably but 
not exclusively due to reforms of pension systems. The effects of pension reforms 
enacted between 2001 and 2005 are noticeable in several countries (DE, EL, FR, IT, NL, 
AT, SI and FI). Except for Slovenia where the indexation of pension after retirement was 
made more generous for pensioners in 2005, reforms resulted in a smaller increase in 
pension expenditure. Between 2005 and 2008, reforms in CZ, DK, and HU led to a lower 
projected increase in the 2009 projections.25 
2.3.3 Fiscal sustainability challenges arising from the impact of 
ageing populations  
The assessment of public finance sustainability in this section is not restricted to 
pensions. It looks at the challenge of ageing to the entire general government sector, so 
for example health care expenditure is included. The total cost of ageing and its 
components are presented in Annex 15.  
                                                 
25 Comparison of results of the 2001, 2006 and 2009 rounds of projections can be found in the Annex 9. 
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The sustainability indicators provide a basis to classify the long-term risks to the 
sustainability of the public finances in EU Member States. They show the size of 
permanent budgetary adjustment required to ensure that the public budget constraint is 
met, taking account of the cost of ageing.26 The S1 indicator shows the adjustment to the 
current structural primary balance required to reach a target government gross debt of 
60% of GDP in 2060. The S2 indicator shows the adjustment to the current structural 
primary balance required to fulfil the infinite horizon intertemporal budget constraint. 
Thus, the difference between S1 and S2 is the length of the time horizon taken, and S1 is 
an indication of the urgency of necessary reforms.  
To make an overall assessment on the sustainability of public finances, other additional 
relevant risk factors are taken into account for a qualitative assessment: high initial level 
of public debt (as indebted countries are more sensitive to economic shocks and interest 
rate changes), deterioration in primary budget balance (as it results in rising debt burden), 
high current tax ratio (as it limits room of manoeuvre for using tax increases), and a 
projected drop in the pension benefit ratio (as it increases the risk of political pressure for 
increasing pension benefits). 
Figure 13 - Overall risk classification and the sustainability gaps (S2 and S1 in the baseline scenario)  
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Source: Commission services 
Hungary reformed its pension system in 2009. According to the revised pension projections, public pension 
expenditure is projected to decrease from 10.9% of GDP in 2007 to 10.5% of GDP in 2060, i.e. by 0.4 p.p. 
of GDP. The revised projection is not included in this graph (see note to Figure 8). 
It should be noted that countries can have similar degree of risks to fiscal sustainability 
but they are result of different factors. In some cases these are significant increases in 
age-related expenditure, in others weak current budgetary positions, or high levels of 
public debt. More detailed analysis by country is presented in the Annex 10.  
                                                 
26 For detailed definitions of the indicators see the 2009 Sustainability Report. 
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The results of the 2009 Sustainability Report differ significantly from those presented in 
the 2006 report. While in 2006 the EU-25 average sustainability gap (S2) was estimated 
at 3.4% of GDP, the current estimates are for 6.5% of GDP. Overall, worsening in the 
current budgetary position has increased the value of S2 by 3.2 p.p. of GDP, as no 
consolidation plans are included in the starting point (current budgetary position) but 
there has been a slight improvement of 0.1 p.p. of GDP in the long-term cost of ageing 
component. Considering national MTOs that reflect fiscal consolidation plans brings the 
S2 indicator closer to 2006 levels (more detailed analysis of long-term sustainability 
before (in 2006) and during the crisis (in 2009) is presented in Annex 10).  
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3 The impact of the crisis 
3.1 The crisis: from the financial sector to the real economy  
The financial crisis that has hit the global economy since the summer of 2007 is without 
precedent in post-war economic history. Although its size and extent are exceptional, the 
crisis has many features in common with similar financial-stress driven recession 
episodes in the past. The crisis was preceded by long period of rapid credit growth, low 
risk premiums, abundant availability of liquidity, strong leveraging, soaring asset prices 
and the development of bubbles in the real estate sector. Over-stretched leveraging 
positions rendered financial institutions extremely vulnerable to corrections in asset 
markets. As a result a turn-around in a relatively small corner of the financial system (the 
US subprime market) was sufficient to topple the whole structure. Such episodes have 
happened before (e.g. Japan and the Nordic countries in the early 1990s, the Asian crisis 
in the late-1990s). However, this time is different, with the crisis being global akin to the 
events that triggered the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
The transmission of financial distress to the real economy evolved at record speed, with 
credit restraint and sagging confidence hitting business investment and household 
demand, notably for consumer durables and housing. The cross-border transmission was 
also extremely rapid, due to the tight connections within the financial system itself and 
also the strongly integrated supply chains in global product markets. EU real GDP is 
projected to have shrunk by some 4% in 2009, the sharpest contraction in its history. And 
although signs of an incipient recovery abound, this is expected to be rather sluggish as 
demand will remain depressed due to deleveraging across the economy as well as painful 
adjustments in the industrial structure. Unless policies change considerably, potential 
output growth will suffer, as parts of the capital stock are obsolete and increased risk 
aversion will weigh on capital formation and R&D.  
The ongoing recession is thus likely to leave deep and long-lasting traces on economic 
performance and entail social hardship of many kinds. Job losses can be contained for 
some time by flexible unemployment benefit arrangements, but eventually the impact of 
rapidly rising unemployment will be felt, with downturns in housing markets occurring 
simultaneously affecting (notably highly-indebted) households. The fiscal positions of 
governments will continue to deteriorate, not only for cyclical reasons, but also in a 
structural manner as tax bases shrink on a permanent basis and contingent liabilities of 
governments stemming from bank rescues may materialise. An open question is whether 
the crisis will weaken the incentives for structural reform and thereby adversely affect 
potential growth further, or whether it will provide an opportunity to undertake far-
reaching policy actions. 
3.2 Economic prospects in the short-term  
3.2.1 EU economy on the road to a gradual recovery 
The Commission's spring 2010 confirms that the economic recovery is underway in the 
EU. A gradual recovery is expected with GDP forecast to grow by 1% in 2010 and 1 ¾% 
in 2011. The near-term rebound in activity follows from improvements in the external 
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environment as well as from the significant fiscal and monetary policy measures put in 
place. Further out, weak domestic demand is set to restrain the strength of the recovery, 
with large differences with regard to its speed among the Member States. In particular, 
labour-market conditions have shown some sighs of stabilisation recently, with the 
unemployment rate projected to peak in 2010 at closed to 10% in the EU. The public 
deficit is also expected to rise, to 7¼% of GDP in 2010, before falling back slightly in 
2011 as the economy picks up and temporary measures gradually come to an end (see 
Annex 12 for developments per Member State). 
Having experienced the deepest, longest and most broad-based recession in its history, 
the EU economy came out of the recession in the third quarter of 2009, largely due to the 
measures put in place under the European Economic Recovery Plan.. Beyond the initial 
rebound, the recovery is proving more gradual than in past upturns. This is not surprising 
given the extraordinary nature of the recent downturn. Cyclical rebounds following 
financial crises tend to be more muted than in other circumstances. Like other developed 
countries, the EU will grapple with the legacy of the crisis for some time to come. 
3.2.2 A gradual post-crisis recovery ahead 
The improved near-term outlook in the EU and abroad is partly the result of temporary 
factors. As the impact of these fade in the course of 2010, economic activity in the EU is 
expected to regain ground more firmly by the end of 2010. Domestic demand faces a 
number of constraints going forward. Reflecting low capacity utilisation, relatively weak 
demand prospects deleveraging and heightened risk aversion hold back investment. 
Although private consumption proved to be a stabilising factor during the recession, 
spending in the period ahead is set to be held back by and weak labour-market prospects 
and wage growth and in a number of countries by the housing market correction.  
3.2.3 Muted labour market prospects 
The EU labour market has been more resilient to the recession than expected, largely on 
account of short-term policy measures, past reforms and labour hoarding in some 
Member States. Signs of stabilisation have recently begun to emerge and the outlook is 
now somewhat improved compared to the autumn forecast. Nevertheless, an increase in 
labour shedding is expected through this year. Employment contracted by around 2¼% in 
2009, and a further decline of about 1% expected in 2010, and it is expected to increase 
during only in 2011 as the recovery takes hold. The unemployment rate is projected to 
stabilise at close to 10% in the EU, though the situation differs markedly across Member 
States. 
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Figure 14 - Commission spring 200 forecast, main variables  
    
    
Source: Commission services 
In terms of recent employment developments, there are considerable differences between 
age groups and between men and women. Workers with "weaker" work contracts, less 
qualified and less experienced workers have borne much of the brunt of the current 
recession. Men tend to be overrepresented in these categories. Conversely, women have 
so far been less affected than men, because the crisis hit first and foremost sectors such as 
construction and manufacturing, where male employment is relatively high. Yet, even the 
female employment rate was falling during 2009 – for the first time during the decade.  
The unemployment rate for young people (15-24) has increased significantly. 
Employment for this group fell by 1.8 million persons (8%) between the fourth quarter of 
2008 and the fourth quarter of 2009. The fall in employment of prime age workers has 
been fast between 2008Q4 and 2009Q1 and then slowed down during 2009.  Still, 
between 2008Q4 and 2009Q4 3.3 million jobs (1.9%) in the prime age group have been 
lost. As regards older workers (55-64), employment rates which grew until the beginning 
of 2009 have been basically constant during the year 2009. As compared to employment 
of young people, good performance of older workers employment is even stronger than in 
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the previous crises of the beginning of 1990's and 2000's. The EU aggregate however 
mask rather heterogeneous developments across Member States. Although, the labour 
market adjustment has so far been sizeable in Spain, Ireland, and the Baltic States, it has 
as yet been relatively limited in Italy and Germany. 
Table 6 - Employment and participation rates by age groups and gender, EU  
Avg 2000-
2007 2008 2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4
Employment rate (ages 15-64)
total 63.2 65.9 65.1 64.7 64.4 64.4
young (15-24) 36.6 37.6 36.0 35.4 34.7 34.5
prime-age (25-54) 77.0 79.6 78.6 78.2 78.0 77.8
older (55-64) 40.4 45.6 46.0 46.1 45.8 46.1
male 70.9 72.8 71.4 70.8 70.5 70.2
female 55.6 59.1 58.8 58.7 58.5 58.5
Participation rate (ages 15-64)
total 69.3 70.9 71.1 71.1 71.0 71.0
young (15-24) 44.5 44.5 44.2 44.1 43.7 43.3
prime-age (25-54) 83.4 84.8 84.9 84.8 84.9 85.0
older (55-64) 43.2 48.1 49.0 49.2 49.1 49.3
male 77.2 78.0 78.0 77.8 77.7 77.6
female 61.5 63.9 64.2 64.4 64.3 64.4
Note: Quarterly data seasonally adjusted
European Union (EU 27)
 
Source: Commission services 
Reversing the rise in unemployment and bringing people back into work will take longer 
than turning the economy around. It will be important that Member States address 
unemployment through labour market measures, including active inclusion strategies, in 
line with the principles agreed by the European Council. 
3.2.4 Public finances under pressure 
Public finances have been hit hard by the crisis with the government deficit set to 
increase rapidly and peak at 7 ¼% of GDP this year in the EU (three times higher than 
the 2008 deficit) and to improve slightly in 2011 to around 6 ½7% . This surge follows 
from the working of automatic stabilisers as the economic situation has deteriorated; the 
discretionary measures taken to support the economy within the framework of the 
European Economic Recovery Plan; and the stronger-than-usual responsiveness of public 
revenues to the exceptional decline in economic activity and, as a result, tax bases, which 
partly reflects the changed composition of growth (towards less tax-rich components). 
Similarly, public debt is bearing the brunt of the crisis and is expected to increase to 79 
½% of GDP in 2010 in the EU (84 3/4 % in the euro area). A certain improvement is 
foreseen in the deficit ratio in 2011 as economic activity picks up and temporary 
measures come to an end. However, the debt ratio remains on an increasing path in view 
of the still high primary deficit and rising interest payments, which have been only partly 
offset by the recovery in nominal GDP growth. Although a one-off increase in 
government debt does not in itself put public-finance sustainability at risk, in 
combination with sustained large deficits, lower potential output and an unfavourable 
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demographic development, the debt evolution is a source of concern for long-term 
sustainability. 
3.3 The potential long-term impact of the current economic 
crisis 
The severe financial and economic crisis that started taking hold in 2008 has prompted 
the question of the extent to which the worsened short-term outlook would have 
implications also over the medium- and longer-term. The AWG/EPC baseline macro-
economic projections are based on the Commission's forecast made in Spring 2008 (up to 
2009). Inevitably, the crisis has led the Commission and other prominent policy makers 
to substantially revise their short-term forecast downwards. In view of the large 
uncertainty regarding the length of the slump in economic activity, three scenarios were 
considered: (i) a pessimistic scenario: 'permanent shock'; (ii) a less pessimistic scenario: 
'lost decade', and; (iii) an optimistic scenario: 'rebound'. These scenarios were prepared 
on the basis of the Commission's Spring 2009 forecast27. 
Over the period 2007-20, the annual growth rate in EU27 is 0.8 to 0.9 p.p. lower in the 
lost decade and permanent shock scenario, respectively. Potential GDP growth for the 
EU27 coincides with the AWG baseline from 2020 in the 'lost decade' and 'rebound' 
scenarios, while it is slower in the 'permanent shock' scenario. Over the entire projection 
period 2007-2060, the average revision of potential GDP growth in the 'lost decade' 
scenario is 0.2 p.p. per year for the EU27. In the worst case 'permanent shock' scenario, a 
larger downward revision of the average annual GDP growth by 0.4 p.p. would 
materialize. 
                                                 
27  See Annex13 for additional details on the analysis of the crisis and European Commission (2009), 
"Impact of the current economic and financial crisis on potential output", European Economy, Occasional 
Papers No. 4.  
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Figure 15 - Potential GDP growth under different shocks (annual growth rate)  
EU27 - potential GDP growth
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Source: Commission services, 2009 Sustainability Report. 
All scenarios show a reduction in GDP per capita over the medium-term relative to the 
baseline, of between 6% and 9% already by 2015. If the recovery from the crisis is 
characterized by a protracted period of subdued potential growth (to 2020), the loss in 
GDP per capita relative to the baseline is around 11% in 2020 – a 'lost decade' - and this 
loss is carried over the rest of the projection period, since the growth projection remains 
broadly unchanged as of 2020. A more marked reduction in the GDP per capita level 
would occur if the growth potential is negatively affected permanently (a 'permanent 
shock'), leading to GDP per capita in 2060 being about 20% lower than in the baseline.  
Table 7 - GDP per capita developments in EU27, difference from the AWG baseline, in %  
2010 2015 2020 2040 2060
Rebound -2 -6 0 0 0
Lost decade -2 -9 -11 -11 -11
Permanent shock -2 -9 -12 -16 -20
EU27, GDP per capita, diff. from baseline (in %)
 
Source: Commission services, 2009 Sustainability Report. 
The budgetary implications of sluggish growth would depend on its duration. If the EU 
economies were to return to the potential growth path prior to the crisis (the lost decade 
scenario), the additional increase in pension expenditure would be 0.9 p.p. of GDP 
higher. If however the EU's growth potential would be affected also in the long-term 
(permanent shock), public pension spending would be 1.4 p.p. of GDP higher than in the 
baseline. Considering the full cost of ageing, the additional expenditure increase would 
be 1.4 p.p. the lost decade scenario and 2 p.p. of GDP permanent shock, respectively. 
These scenarios are tentative and aim at showing the possible deterioration of GDP levels 
and public expenditure28.  
                                                 
28 Specially, in countries such as Spain, where immigration has dropped during the crisis, this tentative 
pension projection could overestimate the number of future new pensions and corresponding spending. 
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Figure 16 - Potential budgetary impact of the economic crisis (pension and total age-related 
expenditure) 
EU27, Pension expenditure, change in 
p.p. of GDP, 2007-60
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Source: Commission services, 2009 Sustainability Report. 
This illustrates that a permanent shock assumed to occur to the key determinants of 
potential growth (employment and labour productivity growth), over the very long-term, 
has a stronger effect on future GDP and per capita income levels than even a very 
protracted period of sluggish growth. The estimations show that the budgetary impact is 
stronger in the case of a permanent shock than in the case of a temporary shock, even if 
the latter is stretched over an entire decade. Moreover, the risk of sluggish growth and 
higher age-related government spending in the 'lost decade' scenario up to 2020 can be 
offset if timely, targeted and well coordinated policies would not only bring Europe out 
of the slump, but would also lead to a rebound of growth such that the temporary shock is 
also reverted, as illustrated in the 'rebound' scenario. Hence, getting the policy response 
right in a coordinated manner would limit the loss of wealth creation in Europe and 
would also lead to less expenditure than would otherwise be the case. 
3.4 The impact of the crisis on fiscal sustainability positions  
Using the tentative crisis scenarios described above, it is possible to estimate its impact 
on the sustainability indicators. This analysis is useful in showing trends of increase but 
should be interpreted with caution as it relies on tentative scenarios. However, there is a 
degree of uncertainty when estimating the structural budgetary position at this juncture 
and the Initial Budgetary Position component does not take into account fiscal 
consolidation measures already implemented by Member States (see Annex 14). The 
results show the effect of the different outcomes for GDP growth on sustainability, but do 
not account for the additional costs associated with the fiscal cost of the recovery 
measures which will add to the stock of debt and increase the primary surplus required to 
service the debt. If these additional costs were added on, an increase in the gap through 
the IBP component would emerge. While this is not insignificant, it is not as large as the 
overall effect of ageing and is also highly uncertain as the final fiscal cost of the crisis 
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will depend on the ability of governments to recoup some or all of the funds they used for 
the recapitalisation of banks and on which share of contingent liabilities borne by the 
government in the context of the crisis (for example State guarantees to deposits and to 
liabilities issued by the banks) will materialise.  
For the ‘rebound’ scenario, the differences with the baseline are all in the short-term, and 
cancel each other out over the long-term. Conversely, for both the other scenarios, the 
lasting impact of the economic crisis puts more pressure on the sustainability of the 
public finances. While the lost decade scenario assumes a return to previously expected 
trend growth, the lower productivity growth for ten years and the lower output that results 
is forecast to increase the sustainability gap as measured by the S2 indicator of 1.1% of 
GDP to 6.0% of GDP for EU 27. According to the Commission's estimates, this increase 
is essentially driven by an increase in the long-term cost of ageing, as an unchanged 
assumption about inflation and therefore the up-rating of pensions leads to higher 
spending as a share of the (lower) GDP.  
In the case of the permanent shock the effect of the crisis on long-term sustainability is 
more marked, as both the productivity and GDP growth are assumed to be on a lower 
trajectory going forward. This leads to an ever growing difference in output levels and an 
increase in the sustainability gap of 1.5% of GDP. This is primarily due to higher long 
term costs of ageing, but the initial budgetary position also contributes more to the gap 
due to the lower GDP growth. Although the analysis undertaken is primarily a partial 
equilibrium exercise, in the case of the permanent shock scenario, a departure from the 
permanent real interest rate of 3% has been made. Instead, it is assumed that the interest 
rate and GDP growth rate differential remains constant, so that interest rates in this case 
are lower than in the baseline. This is because with a permanent change in the trend rate 
of output it would be expected that there is additionally an effect on the return to capital 
and therefore the interest rate.  
 
3.5 The impact of the crisis on pension schemes and its social 
consequences  
With the financial crisis and the economic downturn, Member States have had to assess 
the short- and longer-term impacts on the various elements in their pension schemes. The 
crisis adds to the economic impact of demographic ageing on pension provision, although 
the consequences will critically depend on the depth and length of the downturn. For 
public "pay-as-you-go" pension systems, the slowing of the real economy is bringing 
additional fiscal pressures on financing and contributions. For funded schemes, the crisis 
has exposed their vulnerabilities in financial markets. The crisis has shown the need for 
the right balance between PAYG systems and fully funded systems. The concrete impact 
of the crisis on pension schemes over the long-term and its social consequences remains 
to be seen. Further work is necessary to pinpoint the relative merits of the various pension 
scheme designs. 
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3.5.1 Statutory State Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pensions 
The overall pension income of people retiring today in Europe is provided by statutory 
state pensions funded on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis and it is projected to remain so 
except in a few Member States in the coming decades (cf. SPC 2005). Pensioners have on 
average been relatively little affected by the crisis so far, and the majority of Member 
States have preferred to accept increased deficits to let pension systems play the role of 
automatic stabilisers.  
The effect of the crisis on different cohorts of pensioners varies notably depending on 
how much future pension systems will differ from the current arrangements.  
In most Member States, most retired cohorts today obtain their pensions under changing 
rules but providing for guaranteed pension levels. Budgetary restrictions have led to cuts 
in public pension payments only in a few Member States, and in some others the impacts 
took form of lower indexation. In general, Member States in the majority of cases are 
keeping their promises towards current pensioners.  
On the basis of projected theoretical replacement rates it is possible analyse the impact of 
career breaks on pension entitlements. Younger cohorts in reformed schemes might be 
affected to some extent depending on the design of the scheme. As benefits in PAYG 
schemes are increasingly calculated on life-time earnings-related contributions, long-term 
unemployment can negatively affect the accruals of pension entitlements, having an 
adverse effect on individual pensions in the long-term. Protecting the pension 
entitlements of future pensioners during periods of unemployment is an emerging 
challenge in most pension systems across the EU. The risk of short periods of 
unemployment is well covered by public pension schemes in many Member States. 
Nevertheless, it is definitely less true for long periods and funded pensions (for impact of 
unemployment on the level of theoretical replacement rate see Figure 17). 
 
 
 51
Figure 17 - Accumulated difference in net theoretical replacement rates for an average earner 
entering the labour market at 25 and retiring at the statutory retirement age with a 1, 2 or 3 year 
career break due to unemployment compared with no break*  
 
Source: SPC/ISG* The unemployment break is assumed to take place in the years just prior to old age 
retirement which is assumed here to be the statutory retirement age for men. Note: the values for MT and 
PT are equal to 0 and should not be interpreted as missing. 
Moreover, following the crisis, some Member States decided to increase contribution 
rates, and others have introduced increases in the pensionable age (e.g. HU) or are 
considering to do so (e.g. EL, ES, IE, LV, SI, and RO). In consequence, the burden of 
adjustment in terms of longer working and higher contribution rates will fall primarily 
onto the currently working population. 
3.5.2 Funded defined-benefit and hybrid pension schemes 29 
In an occupational defined-benefit (DB) scheme, benefits accrued are linked to earnings 
and the employment career. It is the scheme sponsor who bears the investment risk and 
often also the longevity risk. A promise is made to the scheme member (the "defined 
benefit").  
The financial crisis saw a fall in asset values and often the assumptions made about 
investment returns have not been met. The regulatory framework at both EU and national 
level is there to ensure that pension funds take action early to address funding levels in 
order to safeguard their long term health. Member State reactions to the problems with 
funded schemes have in the short term been pragmatic. National pension supervisory 
authorities have aimed to allow pension funds more flexibility than normal, e.g. funds 
were given more time to submit funding status reports and recovery plans, and the normal 
maximum period allowed for recovery from deficits has been extended.  
In schemes with conditionality rules (e.g. conditional indexation) pensioners could have 
been affected, e.g. by no indexation, or, in more extreme circumstances, by a reduction in 
                                                 
29 For further information on the impact of the crisis on defined benefit pensions, see 2010 Joint Report on 
Social Protection and Social Inclusion and its supporting documents. 
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the pension, and they would bear more of the cost than scheme members still accruing 
rights. Adjustments to indexation are especially used when schemes are closed to new 
members. 
If the crises has pushed the employer out of business, the Insolvency Directive provides 
some protection if the pension fund is in deficit when an employer is insolvent. Insurance 
type fall-back arrangements may assist pension scheme members in these circumstances, 
but such assistance may be less generous than the pension would otherwise have been. 
In the medium term, the sponsor can foot the bill of the recovery plan, or can ask social 
partners for agreement to increase employee contributions (without increasing pension 
rights). The sponsoring employer can also decide that the level of investment risk, as 
witnessed by the financial crisis, means that accrual rates should be reduced. Other 
measures could include increasing the pensionable age, introducing a defined-
contribution element to the scheme, increasing conditionality rules or even closing the 
scheme to future accruals. 
Dialogue between social partners is often a key element behind the recovery plans, as 
they involve attempts to share the impacts not only over time but also between different 
parties. A greater sharing of risks between scheme members and employers may be 
needed if the decline in DB provision is to be halted and such schemes are to have a 
viable future.  
In DB and hybrid schemes the crisis brings to light questions around intergenerational 
fairness and redistribution: if scheme rules operate with conditionality on investment 
performance, pensioners are likely to be comparatively more affected than those still 
accruing rights.  However, if assets are rebalanced with increased employee contribution 
or change in future benefit accruals, this will proportionately affect active members more. 
The impact of the crisis on the willingness of DB scheme sponsors to offer such schemes 
in the future, given the existing regulatory framework, remains to be seen. 
3.5.3 Funded defined-contribution pension schemes 30 
In a defined-contribution (DC) plan, the scheme member bears the investment risk and is 
directly affected by investment performance. Overall, private pension funds lost more 
than 20% of their value in the course of 2008, but many pension funds have been able to 
recoup some of their losses since then31. The member is at risk of poor performance but 
benefits from any positive performance. Volatility is a fact of life in these plans; for all 
the concern sparked by the crisis, in many Member States DC funds have recovered well 
in 2009 and early 2010, regaining much of the value lost in 2008 (more than 20%), so 
that those some way from retirement have largely recovered their positions.  
For those some way from retirement there may be time for asset values to recover or 
recover partially. But for those close to retirement the impact can be real, leading to 
lower than expected pension incomes, or delayed retirement. However, the crisis impact 
is likely to have been mitigated by investment strategies such as "lifestyling" (which 
                                                 
30 For further information on the impact of the crisis on defined contribution pensions, see 2010 Joint 
Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion and its supporting documents. 
31  See OECD "Pension Markets in Focus".  October 2009, Issue 6. 
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implies higher investment risk when scheme member is younger) or cautious 
investments, as well as by the fact that only a few individuals currently retiring will be 
relying mainly on a DC pension outcome.  
In some Member States the market has also successfully responded to the issues posed by 
DC by developing different investment and decumulation strategies which are designed 
to maximise choice and flexibility for members. Investment strategies such as Target 
Date Funds and DC Banking are designed to work on similar lines to lifestyling, while in 
the decumulation phase there is considerable choice on annuity purchases and over 
whether to draw an income from the fund whilst leaving it invested. 
The choice between investment strategies with different potential rates of return and 
levels of risk leads to questions as to the accuracy of information. In statutory schemes 
where there was a choice between continuing in DB PAYG schemes or moving part of 
the contributions to the new DC funded scheme, people often opted for a defined-
contribution scheme even if it was questionable whether this was indeed the best solution 
for them. And regarding the choice of pension funds and investment strategies, evidence 
suggests that many people went for riskier options than would have been justified given 
their earning capacity and the length of their working life. These choices were driven by 
the information people received at the time. Rates of return observed in the past and the 
positive growth expectations for central and eastern European countries obviously played 
a role. Hence, access to unbiased information is of key importance and not only in funded 
defined-contribution schemes. 
A common feature for Member States that have introduced statutory DC schemes is the 
need to shoulder net transition costs. Often Member States divert part of the contribution 
from the PAYG scheme into the funded scheme while covering the shortfall from the 
state budget though general taxation. Other strategies have included increasing total 
contribution rates to pension schemes, using revenues from privatising state enterprises, 
or shifting part of the cost to current pensioners, e.g. through the introduction of less 
favourable indexation rules, or to future beneficiaries of the PAYG schemes32. 
The reforms usually made participation in the funded scheme mandatory for younger 
generations, while people nearing retirement were excluded, and intermediate cohorts had 
the choice to join or not. In some Member States, however, the net transition costs turned 
out to be higher than anticipated, as the numbers of workers who moved to the mixed 
PAYG-funded system considerably exceeded official estimates. 
Bringing forward costs by increasing pre-funding has placed strains on Members States' 
fiscal positions, and the current economic situation provides a serious stress test of the 
viability of such arrangements. Facing a growing fiscal gap, some Member States have 
decided to limit the relative burden of pre-funding future pension expenditure by 
reducing the proportion of social security contributions diverted to mandatory DC 
schemes. In consequence, pre-crisis projections of future importance of funded schemes 
in pensioner income might be in some cases overestimated. 
                                                 
32 According to the 2008 SPC study "Privately Managed Funded Pension Provision and their 
Contribution to Adequate and Sustainable Pensions", pp.18-19. 
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Despite the anti-cyclical effect of reducing the cost of pre-funding by shifting part of 
contributions from mandatory funded schemes to PAYG schemes, i.e. shrinking the 
aggregate savings rate, strong arguments against decreasing the pre-funding burden could 
be found. The inflow of contributions to funded schemes is reduced when prices of assets 
are low and offer greater growth prospects. This might imply a decline in the expected 
rates of return. While it is understandable that public authorities see the need to adjust 
their mandatory private funded schemes, one should not forget that pension systems need 
stability over the long term and should be designed to weather both in good and bad 
economic times if they are to have the necessary credibility among citizens. Hence, 
transparency and long-term planning are important. 
Unemployment may affect the accruals of pension entitlements much more in funded DC 
systems than in DB systems. In most funded DC systems, there is no contributions in 
case of unemployment, whereas is DB systems, often unemployment generates some 
rights. 
To sum up, moving towards more private sector funded pension provision can help 
reduce explicit public finance liabilities, but it also creates new challenges and forms of 
risks. Variations in the ability of funded schemes to weather the present crisis show that 
differences in design, regulation and investment strategy matter. Achieving a better 
balance for pension savers and pension providers between risks, security and 
sustainability will be key to enhance public confidence in funded pensions and ensure 
their contribution to adequacy. 
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4 Policy challenges over the long-term 
4.1 Securing sustainable and adequate pensions  
Ensuring that public policies cater for sustainable, accessible and adequate retirement 
incomes remains a priority for economic policies in the EU. While Member States share 
similar fundamental challenges, the situation differs considerably across the Union, both 
in terms of demographic prospects, growth potential (catching up effects), design of 
pension (and welfare system) arrangements and in terms of constraints on account of the 
fiscal situation and external competitiveness. For several countries where the pension 
reforms process has not been set in motion, the pre-crisis message firmly remains; there 
is a need to align the 'pension promise' with what the rest of the economy can be expected 
to support. For other countries, additional reforms might be needed to ensure the lasting 
success of already implemented pension reforms. 
There has been considerable progress in the last decade in analysing and assessing the 
challenges to pension policy posed in particular by population ageing. Several Member 
States now pay due consideration in their medium-term budgetary planning to the long-
term sustainability and viability of public spending programmes and to the future fiscal 
positions overall. The EU fiscal framework – strengthened with the 2005 reform of the 
Stability and Growth Pact – explicitly addresses the link between medium-term 
budgetary policies and long-term trends that can affect fiscal positions. In particular, the 
structural budgetary targets – the Medium-Term Budgetary Objectives (MTOs) - that 
Member States have set take account of the future pressures on public budgets that arise 
from demographic transition to an older population.  
In this respect, structural polices, including modern social protection systems, and their 
contribution to employment, productivity and economic growth is at the heart of policy-
making. This involves all aspects of pension policy:  
− striking the right balance between the role of public and private tiers, including 
the importance of the public schemes in providing (minimum) retirement income, 
capacity of private tiers to support retirement incomes, issues related to the extent 
to which the regulatory framework for private pensions ensure efficiency and 
security and facilitate labour mobility at national and European level);  
− eligibility criteria (prolonging working lives, adjusting the retirement age);  
− definition of pension system parameters before and after retirement (accumulation 
and valorisation of pension rights, and indexation of pension benefits after 
retirement), and improving the functioning of pension policy, providing 
sustainable and adequate retirement incomes for older people.  
A major challenge will be to create the appropriate conditions for older workers to remain 
longer in the labour market in the future so as to successfully seize the opportunity to 
make the EU economies sustainable in the long-term, in view of known challenges like 
population ageing.  
On top of these prospects, the scale of fiscal deterioration as a result of the crisis puts 
severe constraints on fiscal policies which in combination with pre-existing weaknesses 
and imbalances are generating an unprecedented need for resolute and coordinated fiscal 
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consolidation. In addition to the necessity of the putting the EU's fiscal house in order, 
getting structural polices right is also pressing. In fact, it would seem that on account of 
the crisis and the fast-approaching demographic transition, the strategy agreed by the 
European Council for coping with an ageing population namely: (i) debt reduction, (ii) 
productivity and employment enhancing measures; and, (iii) reforms of Member State 
welfare systems, would have to progress from a 'pick and choose' list to an almost 
compulsory set of reform priorities. 
4.2 Main challenges faced by Member States 
On the basis of agreed measurements and using calculations by the European 
Commission and the Member States in the context of the joint long-term budgetary 
projection exercise and the social OMC, it is possible to graphically represent the future 
adequacy and sustainability challenges in pensions.33 Figure 18 shows the scale and 
scope of challenges to pension policy in Member States in a comprehensive way, 
combining measurements of future sustainability and adequacy of pensions. It shows the 
projected evolution of pension expenditure as measure of sustainability and changes in 
the benefit ratio, as measures of future adequacy. Annex 16 provides detailed graphs with 
the evolution of pension expenditure and the benefit ratio.34 
 
                                                 
33 See the 2009 Ageing Report. 
34 See Table 4 in Chapter II for a breakdown of the benefit ratio developments by sector and Annex 5 for 
more details on replacement rates. 
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Figure 18 - Pension policy challenges - pension expenditure and benefit ratio  
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Source: Commission services, 2009 Ageing Report. 
Note: The horizontal axis shows the projected change (p.p.) in public pension expenditure as a share of 
GDP over the period 2007-60. The vertical axis shows to the projected change (p.p.) in the benefit ratio 
over the period 2007-60. The benefit ratio is defined as the average pension in relation to the average wage. 
The calculation of the benefit ratio includes public pensions and in addition private pensions to the extent 
this information was available in the 2009 Ageing Report. See the 2009 Ageing Report for further details. 
Hungary reformed its pension system in 2009. According to the revised pension projections, public pension 
expenditure is projected to decrease from 10.9% of GDP in 2007 to 10.5% of GDP in 2060, i.e. by 0.4 p.p. 
of GDP, compared with the projection in the 2009 Ageing Report, where an increase of 3 p.p. of GDP 
between 2007 and 2060 was projected. The revised projection is not included in this graph (see note to 
Figure 8). 
4.2.1 Upward but uneven pressures on public spending on 
pensions… 
There is a very large diversity across Member States as regards the projected change in 
public pension expenditure, ranging from a decline of -2.8 p.p. of GDP (PL) to an 
increase of 15.2 p.p. of GDP (LU):  
• The increase in public pension spending will be very significant in several EU 
Member States (BE, EL, ES, CY, LU, MT, RO, SI and IE) with a projected increase of 
almost 5 p.p. of GDP or more (and of more than 10 p.p. of GDP in EL, CY and LU) 
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although for some countries the large increase is from a low level and mainly due to 
maturing pension systems. For most of the countries with a high projected increase in 
future pension expenditure, reforming the pension systems must play a significant part in 
curbing the long-term costs of ageing. 
• For a second group of countries – BG, CZ, DE, LT, NL, SK, FI and the UK - the 
increase is more limited, but still high, ranging from about 2 p.p. to 5 p.p. of GDP. 
Several of these countries have taken some steps in reforming pensions that contribute to 
limit the increase in public expenditure, but further policy action is needed.  
• Finally, the increase is more moderate, about to 2 p.p. of GDP or less, in DK, EE, 
FR, IT, LV, AT, PL, PT HU35, and SE. Most of these countries have implemented 
substantial pension reforms, in several cases also involving a partial switch to funded, 
privately managed, pension schemes (EE, LV, PL, HU and SE). 
Looking at the composition of public pension expenditure; old-age and early pensions are 
projected to increase by 2.4% of GDP between 2007 and 2060 in the EU. In the euro 
area, the increase is projected to be slightly higher at 2.6% of GDP. A smaller increase is 
projected for other pension expenditure, mainly disability and survivor pensions, 
increasing only slightly by 0.1. p.p. of GDP in the euro area. It should be stressed that the 
ratio has been pushed downwards due to a shift from public scheme towards private 
mandatory schemes in BG, EE, LV, LT, HU, PL, SK and SE.36 
As regards spending on disability and survivor pensions, they are projected to decrease in 
the majority of countries. Only in 8 Member States (PT, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE and UK) is it 
projected to increase, although only slightly. 
Nonetheless, public spending on pensions as a share of GDP is likely to continue to 
increase in coming decades. Further spending pressures are likely also in other areas, 
such as health care (Annex 15 provides projections for all age-related expenditure items).  
4.2.2 …coupled with potential calls for higher retirement incomes… 
In general, as it currently stands, the projected increase in pension expenditure as a share 
of GDP is not likely to be coupled with improvements in pension adequacy.   
Looking at the development of the net theoretical replacement rates37 (see Figure 5), in 
many Member States the upward trend in pension spending goes together with a 
downward trend in the net theoretical replacement rate for a theoretical individual retiring 
at a given age under given assumptions (CZ, FR, EL, ES, FI, IE, LV, LT, MT, PT and 
UK). In other countries we can expect an increase in pension expenditure concomitant to 
higher theoretical replacement rates (as in AT, BE, BG, CY, DE, DK, HU, IT, NL, RO, 
                                                 
35  See note to Figure 8. 
36  In the case of LU, the pension projection is affected by the considerable number of cross border 
workers who will in the future years receive a pension from the LU social security scheme, but at the same 
time will not be registered as LU inhabitants. Due to this peculiar circumstance, LU can not be, in same 
cases, strictly compared with other MS.  
37 For more detailed information see the SPC-ISG report "Updates of current and prospective theoretical 
pension replacement rates 2006-2046",  
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=752&newsId=551&furtherNews=yes 
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SI and SK) or pension expenditure cuts concomitant to lower replacement rates 38(PL and 
SE). Only in EE are synergies for more adequate and sustainable pensions projected in 
the long-term. It should also be noted that EE, like other countries with a more positive 
evolution in replacement rates (RO, BG and CY) start off from rather low initial levels of 
the theoretical rates.  
For the EU-27 as a whole, the net theoretical replacement rates are projected to decline 
by 4.25 pp or 5.4% drop with respect to the initial level (GDP-weighed averages).  
The changes in theoretical replacement rates allow for monitoring how enacted reforms 
affect future pensions for given situations and under given assumptions (for example, a 
certain career length and retirement age). However, they do not take account of all 
factors. For example, rising female labour force participation in all Member States will 
result in more numerous and probably higher female pensions (if we assume women's 
careers partially converging to men's). Similarly, the drop in replacement rates should be 
seen in relation to the fact that more people will be entitled to pensions. Furthermore, two 
major axes have been developed by Member States to cater for the projected decline in 
replacement rates at a given age: on the one hand the strengthening of incentives to work 
longer and on the other hand, the development of supplementary (private) pensions. 
Thus, for example, calculations for variant cases show that in most Member States if 
people postpone their retirement this will result in entitlement to higher replacement rates 
(see Annex 5). Due to reforms of this kind and structural evolutions the trend towards 
lower theoretical replacement rates can be to a significant extent counterbalanced by 
working longer and the build-up of supplementary pension entitlements and savings, 
including higher labour force participation of women in the future, which thus represent 
also key elements and challenges for pension policy design. 
Looking at the development of the (gross) benefit ratio, it is projected to fall by 8.5 p.p. 
over the period 2007-2060 for the EU as a whole: the value of the ratio drops from 52 in 
2007 to 43.5 in 2060, that is, a 16.4% with respect to the initial level.  
In the majority of countries the benefit ratio is projected to fall in the long-term: 
- In countries like FR, IT, AT, PL, PT, SE, DE and CZ average pensions in relation to 
average income (the benefit ratio) are projected to fall considerably by 2060 (i.e. by at 
least 7.5 p.p. and at least 17% with respect to the initial levels of the corresponding 
country in 2007). As indicated above, unless policies change, the pressures on the 
government to support pensions in these countries are likely to be large.  
- In other countries the fall in the benefit ratio is more limited though still sizeable: EE, 
SK, ES, BG, MT, BE, FI, LU, HU, LT, SI would see their benefit ratios drop by up to 5.1 
pp and by 10.9% with respect to the initial levels in 200739. 
- Finally, the benefit ratio is projected to raise by up to 10.6 pp in a few countries (RO, 
DK, IE, EL, NL, UK, CY, LV). In all these countries but LV the increase in the benefit 
ratio comes together with upward pressures on the pension expenditures. 
                                                 
38 Lower replacement rates can result from reforms that lower the pension benefit or reduce access to early 
pension disability pension schemes. 
39 With the exception of EE in this grouping, as its benefit ratio is projected to fall by 2060 by 4.6 pp and 
17.7% with respect to its initial level of the ratio in 2007. 
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To get the full picture it is important to consider also the level of pension benefits, and 
not only its evolution over the long-term. Thus, the situation might be challenging for 
countries where the benefit ratio is projected to be around one third or less in 2060 on 
current polices. 
Whether measured by the replacement rates or by the benefit ratio securing the future 
adequacy of pensions remains a challenge.  
It is difficult to pinpoint a specific level where the average pension becomes too low in 
terms of social and political sustainability. However, it is conceivable that a strong 
reduction in relative pensions over time will generate pressure on total public spending 
regardless of the legislation and policies in place. Moreover, where average pensions are 
low today in relative terms, the pressures might be higher than where they are relatively 
higher, due to risks of expanding poverty.  
However, pressures for higher pensions are not only an issue for countries with relatively 
low pensions on a comparative basis. In countries with a high pension in relative terms, a 
societal expectation for the continuation of the current situation may develop. This would 
indicate that, apart from the need of further reforms and modernisation, careful 
preparation and information on the future pension promise will be necessary to ensure the 
lasting success of reforms. 
In brief, the analysis of the two indicators of future relative pension levels compared with 
future pension expenditure suggests that: 
− Reforms implemented with a view to strengthening the sustainability of public 
pension arrangements have resulted in often relatively limited reductions in 
replacement rates at a given age over the long-term in the EU as a whole. This 
contributes to stability in pensions which is crucial for individuals when planning 
their savings and consumption over time. For some countries, however, the 
reduction in replacement rates may be substantial. 
− Strong declines in relative pensions will primarily affect those with very long 
retirement periods. Safeguarding relatively stable replacement rates while 
enhancing strongly the sustainability of the public pension system though price 
indexation after retirement entails the risk of public pensions becoming too low 
over time compared to wages. Those with lower life expectancy at withdrawal 
would be much less affected. This could mean that older pensioners will become 
more at risk of poverty; however evidence suggests that individuals with high life 
expectancy at retirement generally have had fuller working careers, earned higher 
salaries and hence accumulate higher entitlements. This group is also most prone 
to have accumulated private retirement savings.   
4.2.3 …at a time when fiscal conditions are more strained than ever… 
The EU's short-term response to the crisis has worked well but the time has now come to 
design and communicate robust exit strategies. The European Union responded strongly 
in 2008 and 2009 to keep the major short-term risks of the crisis from materialising. The 
substantial support to financial institutions helped avert a meltdown and stabilise the 
financial sector. The implementation of the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) 
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proved effective in containing the immediate economic and social impact of the crisis. 
Close co-ordination of these policies at EU level played a major role in rendering their 
implementation effective and in enhancing their positive effect on confidence.  
Figure 19 - Public finances in EU Member States in 2009 
Public finances, 2009, % of GDP
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Source: Commission services, AMECO. 
Note: The 'deficit' is the cyclically adjusted budget balance of general government (based on potential 
GDP) estimated on the basis of the Commission spring 2010 forecast. The 'debt' is the general government 
consolidated gross debt at year end as given in the Commission spring 2010 forecast. 
However, combined with the wider effects of the crisis, these measures have come at a 
very significant budgetary cost. The structural deficit stood at 5 ¼ % of GDP in 2009 and 
the debt position at 74% at end-2009 in the EU (see Figure 19). This is the worst position 
observed in the EU since 1970 in terms of debt level (see Annex 12). In 2009, only six 
Member States (EE, BG, LU, DK, SE and FI) complied with the basic fiscal rules in the 
EU40. Almost half of the Member States (EL, IE, UK, ES, PT, RO, PL, LT, SK, LV,FR, 
CYand CZ) had a structural deficit of more than 5% of GDP. Eleven countries (NL, IE, 
                                                 
40 It should be noted that the EU fiscal rules are applicable to the actual deficits, but that the structural 
deficits are taken into consideration too (see Article 104 of the Treaty and the related legislation that forms 
the Stability and Growth Pact).  
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AT, UK, MT, DE, PT, FR, HU, BE, EL and IT) had a debt ratio above the 60% of GDP 
Treaty reference value. For some of the countries with too high deficit and debt ratios 
(NL, IE, UK, MT, PT, FR, BE, EL and IT) the situation may entail risks.41 
In 2010, almost no Member State is expected to attain their MTO (see Figure 20).42 A 
large majority of them has a long way to go not only to reach the MTOs, but also to 
comply with the Treaty's 3% deficit threshold. Annex 17 shows that considerable fiscal 
consolidation over a protracted period of time would be necessary so as to put the debt-
to-GDP ratio on a descending path. 
 
Figure 20 - Medium-term budgetary objectives (MTO) and fiscal positions, % of GDP  
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Source: Commission services, AMECO. 
Note: The MTOs are those of the 2009/101 SCPs. The cyclically adjusted balances are those of the 
Commission services Spring 2010 forecast. 
4.2.4 …the crisis has clearly exposed the interdependence of the 
various pension pillars 
The crisis has clearly exposed the interdependence of the various pension tiers within 
each Member State and the importance of a European approach to pension systems, 
notably on fiscal sustainability, solvency and social adequacy.  
The crisis made it clear that as rates of return can turn negative at times, funded pensions 
need to be underpinned by a solid, public scheme. Moreover, the effects of fluctuations in 
the markets can be mitigated with appropriate policies, e.g. mandatory lifestyling. Need 
for safety in pensions and a need for economic growth are other aspects brought by the 
crisis. Safety because EU citizens are concerned about income both when working 
(earnings) and when retired (pensions). Growth because it enables higher income and 
                                                 
41 See Chapter III, for the evolution of public finances in a longer-term perspective. 
42 The cyclically-adjusted balance is estimated on the basis of the Commission's Autumn 2009 forecast.  
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increased living standards for all and because it is a prerequisite for having sustainable 
and adequate pensions. These are issues which are at the heart of economic policy 
making in the EU, providing a clear link with the overall EU 2020 strategy. They also 
raise the issue of the extent to which the current governance framework for pension 
policy in the EU is able to deliver on these fronts. 
The economic crisis has revealed that there is a need for an in-depth and open discussion 
about pension systems in Europe, in particular about the relative role, design and 
performance of private pension pillars. All private retirement savings plans (and 
mandatory private individual accounts) rely on financial markets. In the field of funded 
pensions, many private (but also public reserves) pension funds saw the book value of 
their investments dwindle as stock markets tumbled. Funding ratios of defined-benefit 
schemes have also been impacted by falls in market interest rates used to measure future 
liabilities in net present value terms.  Funded pension arrangements, particularly those 
which are collective in nature and where the scheme member does not take all the risk, 
but share it, have proved to be quite resilient in the shorter term. In many Member States, 
DC funds have recovered well in 2009 and early 2010, regaining much of the value lost 
in 2008 (more than 20%), so that those some way from retirement have largely recovered 
their positions. The impact of these falls has also stress tested to the limit adjustment 
mechanisms in funded DB schemes and exposed some weaknesses.   
4.3 Conclusions 
 
There has been considerable progress in reforming pension arrangements in the last 
decade. While system designs differ markedly between Member States, a majority have 
adapted their pension systems so as to better withstand the demographic change that will 
start taking hold already next decade.  
Despite this progress, in many EU Member States the challenge of transforming systems 
of pension provision to better cope with an ageing population is still very real. According 
to the most recent Eurostat projections, the size of the working-age population (15-64) 
will start shrinking from 2012. Potential economic growth will have to rely less on an 
increase in labour supply and more on productivity-enhancing measures. This will have 
far-reaching consequences for economic and budgetary developments.  
On top of these prospects, the financial and economic crisis has led to a sharp 
deterioration in the public finances; public deficits and debt levels have increased 
sharply, which is putting stress also on social protection-related public spending 
programmes. Moreover, in the field of pensions, many private pension funds have seen 
their investments fall in value, and there is uncertainty as to when and to what extent 
these investments will be recovered.  
As a result, there is a need to carefully review pension policy in the context of the 
aftermath of the crisis and the overall Europe 2020 vision, taking a holistic approach in 
view of delivering sustainable and adequate retirement incomes. This call for policy that 
builds on the many interlinkages between labour markets, social protection systems, 
financial market policies, and migration policies and develops the synergies necessary to 
deliver pension that are adequate and sustainable. 
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4.3.1 Most reforms provide stronger work incentives to contribute to 
sustainability… 
A tightening of the eligibility criteria for a public pension (higher pensionable age, 
reduced access to early retirement) is expected to help constrain the growth in public 
pension expenditure in almost every Member State. Most pension reforms aim to support 
higher participation rates of older workers by offering economic incentives to increase 
the effective retirement age. Achieving the necessary extension in working lives will 
prove challenging as adjustments will be needed in the expectations and behaviour of 
citizens.  
In some countries, the scale of reforms to public pension systems has been insufficient 
and there is a critical need for ensuring that retirement behaviour takes due account of 
future increases in life expectancy. 
Higher participation and employment rates are needed. But there are currently many hard 
and soft barriers that limit the extent to which older workers can extend their working 
life, including health status. Despite considerable progress more policy action is 
necessary. Structural reforms, including the flexicurity approach, may provide stronger 
work incentives, for instance.  
The employment rate for women still lags behind that of men. While employment rates 
for older workers have increased considerably in recent years only around 50% of people 
are still in employment by the age of 60. Raising the employment rates of older workers, 
including those over 65 will be crucial for the ability of Member States to smooth the 
transition from large to smaller cohorts and deliver adequate and sustainable pensions. 
Underemployed older workers, middle-aged women and migrants represent a huge 
untapped resource for the European economy.  
4.3.2 …and if incentives stimulate working longer they will also 
contribute to adequacy… 
Higher employment rates can lead to very large welfare gains. Higher employment does 
not, per se, lead to lower public spending on pensions as a share of GDP as higher or 
longer employment can result in the accumulation of greater and more adequate pension 
entitlements, thus contributing to social sustainability. However, measures which raise 
employment do strengthen the financial sustainability of pension systems by delaying the 
onset of expenditure rises and through increased contributions and GDP growth.  
Achieving the necessary extension in working lives will not be easy. It not only requires 
that tax/benefit and wage systems provide financial incentives for people to remain 
economically active and invest in building their own human capital, but it also means that 
there must be job opportunities for older people. Policies to tackle age-related 
discrimination and to promote life-long learning, flexible retirement pathways and 
healthy and flexible work conditions also need to be considered. Perhaps the most 
challenging aspect of efforts to increase effective retirement ages is the need to change 
the expectations and behaviour of employers and employees alike. Moreover, the concept 
of ageing is evolving, and with life expectancy projected to continue rising, retirement 
behaviour may also need to adjust continuously.  
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4.3.3 …still adequacy concerns might increase 
Reduced relative levels of public pensions compared to average wages are one of the 
methods for reducing age-related pressure on the public finances. The analysis shows that 
in the EU average public pension benefits are rising more slowly than wages and 
replacement incomes at the time of retirement are falling if people retire at the same age 
as today. This implies that on average pensioners will experience a relative deterioration 
in living standards vis-à-vis workers in the future unless they prolong their working lives. 
The recent EC-EPC projections along with analysis carried out within the framework of 
Open Method of Coordination in Social Protection and Social Inclusion suggests that 
future relative pensioners' income will decline substantially in a number of Member 
States.43  
The 2006 Sustainability Report considered the possibility that the risk of inadequate 
pensions could result in unforeseen pressure for ad hoc increases of pensions or higher 
demand for other benefits.44 Thus the issues of pension adequacy, sustainability and 
modernisation need to be considered together. Moreover, safety in pensions is important 
to support adequacy. Moreover, the macroeconomic benefits of making pension systems 
safer could be felt quickly as pensioners are a growing source of stable and regular 
consumption. The disparate developments in Member States' pension system and the 
trend towards defined contribution schemes, however, raise new policy questions. Key 
instruments to ensure safety are the solvency rules for pension funds and legal protection 
in case of insolvency of the pension fund and/or of the sponsoring employer. Enhancing 
transparency, information and awareness can also help. Moreover, financial education is 
needed so that people are better equipped to make informed decisions regarding their 
pension benefits.  
4.3.4 Continued collaboration at EU level provides value added 
Although the framework – the three-pronged Stockholm strategy - for coping with the 
challenge posed by ageing populations generally remains valid, the crisis has added to the 
urgency of using a holistic approach to pension policy, taking due account of country-
specific differences. Consolidating the public finances and moving towards the medium-
term budgetary objectives (MTOs) is essential in order to reduce public debt and to 
contribute to financing the future increase in public pension expenditure. Thus the crisis 
has reminded us that good regulation of financial markets is a key component of good 
pension policy, notably after the last decade of pension reforms. In turn macroeconomic 
stability is a precondition for financial markets and the pension system to work well. In 
addition, the crisis has revealed some weaknesses in certain aspects of reformed systems 
that need addressing. Finally it has exposed a need to review the design of certain aspects 
of pension policy, in particular the role of funded schemes and the interaction between 
public and private pillars. There is no single best pension system design for all countries 
and thus no one-size-fits-all solution in the EU of 27 Member States. Different countries 
need to find different solutions to achieve the main objectives of pension systems 
(poverty prevention, insurance, consumption smoothing and redistribution). Nonetheless, 
                                                 
43 COM (2009) 58 final. 
44 COM (2006) 574 final. 
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policy coordination at European level provides value added in making progress towards 
delivering adequate, sustainable and safer pensions. 
